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the normalization of czechoslovakia
STEPHEN R. BOWERS & T. DAVID PORT

contemporary soviet modernization and its ethnic implications: 1959-1979
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the population crisis in sub-saharan africa
JACOB MEERMAN & SUSAN HILL COCHRANE

the family in sweden
ERIC BRODIN

sex and voting behavior in the united states of america
ELIZABETH MONK-TURNER

affirmative action
WALTER G. THOMPSON

contradictions of unionism
MORGAN REYNOLDS

television debates and presidential elections: the united states and france
ROBERT E. GILBERT

Contemporary Economics and Business Association
at George Mason University
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Vol. 7 No. 4

CONTENTS

The Normalization of Czechoslovakia 323
By Stephen R. Bowers

Contemporary Soviet Modernization and its Ethnic Implications: 1959-1979 337
By Nicholas Dima

The Population Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa 349
By Jacob Meerman & Susan Hill Cochrane

The Family in Sweden 357
By Eric Brodin

Sex and Voting Behavior in the United States of America . 369
By Elizabeth Monk-Turner

Affirmative Action 377
By Walter G. Thompson

Contradictions of Unionism 387
By Morgan Reynolds

Television Debates and Presidential Elections: The United States and France 411
By Robert E. Gilbert

Book Reviews 430

Index to Volume Seven 432

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THE NORMALIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By Stephen R. Bowers
and
T. David Port

The process of normalization or consolidation in Czechoslovakia has called attention to what may be regarded as the fundamental question of the future of socialism in Eastern Europe: Is it possible to "liberalize" the Marxist-Leninist state? Events in Czechoslovakia in the decade after Dûbcek's "Prague Spring" have strengthened the negative view expressed by Jean-Francois Revel who has argued that "all proposals to liberalize communist rule have been rejected by the logic of the system." He defined the logic of the system as an impulse to eliminate any challenge to the regime's rule and an adherence to a dogmatic worldview which produces an attitude of certainty and intolerance. "Stalinism," Revel insists, "is the very essence of communism". While the harshness of communist rule may vary, in Revel's view, the Stalinist element is always present.(1)

Czechoslovakia's decade of normalization gives validity to Revel's negative proposition. It is the purpose of this examination of developments in the post-Dubĉek years to chart the process of normalization and demonstrate how the Husak regime has worked to regain exclusive control over events in Czechoslovakia. While normalization has involved a combination of coercion and consumerism, economic difficulties of the latter part of the decade have increased official dependence on the first component of this process.(2)

This analysis will focus on three primary concerns: first, a description of the coercive elements of normalization during this period; second, a determination of the degree of Stalinism evident in the regime's conduct; and, third, an evaluation of the significance of normalization of Czechoslovakia, for Eastern Europe, and the world communist movement.

Most studies of communist party states recognize that ideology is at least one of the foundations for policy. Ideology in the socialist system serves the function of religion and culture in the non-socialist state. It limits the range of alternatives open to both collective and individual action. In view of

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its special importance, ideology clearly requires the utmost protection in the communist party state. Czechoslovakia, during its decade of normalization, has taken this requirement most seriously as officials have identified those institutions and philosophies which are thought to pose a danger to the official belief system of the regime.

Only one established institution has, in the official view, posed such a threat: the church. There have been three elements of the regime's posture toward the church. The first has focused on Western church organizations and has been expressed in charges that Western religious organizations "take a leading position in the criticism of Marxism-Leninism." Their efforts are said to be aimed at convincing people in the socialist states as well as in the West that communism is "anti-human and anti-Christian."(3) The second feature of official policy suggests a link, tenuous though it may be, between Western churches and those in Czechoslovakia. A 1974 Central Committee meeting set the tone for this, demanding greater attention to "atheistic education" in order to reduce the impact of this "retarding element" in Czech society. Religion, party officials complain, is the only ideology alien to Marxism-Leninism which still exists in socialist society. The regime's third point is still more emphatic: that many church leaders are politically unreliable. Of the 3,530 Catholic clergymen who live in Czechoslovakia, over 500 are forbidden by the state to perform pastoral duties. The case of Bishop Josef Korec, who was required to abandon his church responsibilities and go to work in a chemical factory in spite of health problems, illustrates the position of many Czech religious leaders.(4) While officials such as Karel Hruze, head of the Czechoslovakian Federal Government's Church Secretariat, deny that freedom of religion has been curtailed, they do confirm that the state exercises control over all church operations.(5)

But if the churches are the only surviving organizations regarded as dangerous, there are many philosophies and attitudes surviving which are said to be inhibiting the full development of Czechoslovakia in a manner consistent with the party's dictates. Among the most obvious of these is the "petit bourgeois mentality," a malignancy cursed by every communist regime throughout the world. The Czech definition of this attitude, however, is particularly broad and encompasses

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almost any critic. A petit bourgeois person, we are told, "composes alarming and completely unfounded reports of calamities awaiting consumers, savers, and working people." Moreover, this individual labors under the mistaken notion that socialism is a "consumer-society set-up intended to cater to his wants as a consumer."(6) Revisionism is another ghost haunting the Husak regime, a dangerous philosophy which "brought the party and all society to the verge of catastrophy." There are, the party daily, *Rude Pravo*, warns, still people who "would like to evoke and rekindle revisionist theories."(7) Opportunism is a third threat cited in this category. Radio Prague has described this as one of the "main dangers for society" because people either ignore it or do not realize its harmful effects. Opportunism, we are told, leads to the non-implementation of party and government directives.(8) But it is nationalism, especially Slovak nationalism, that is seen as posing possibly one of the most persistent threats to the regime's ideological framework. There have been several incidents during recent years, including at least one well publicized trial in which defendents received sentences of up to four years imprisonment, highlighting the continuing survival of nationist ideology in Slovakia.(9) The party has issued repeated demands for an application of "Leninist norms on the nationality question" in an effort to overcome this problem.

While the official ideology is "sheltered" from hostile philosophies, it is equally important that it be protected from those individuals who attempt to erode its authority. Obviously, denunciations of "alien" ideologies are meaningless if not linked to actions against those espousing such conceptions. The extent to which measures are taken to insure that the standard litany of hostile philosophies is accompanied by effective steps against those associated with them is significant in illustrating a new element in Czechoslovakia during normalization. The first step in this direction is an identification of the regime's specific enemies. The emigre critics, frustratingly beyond the casual official reach of the Czech security forces, are the object of special fury. These emigres, regime spokesmen allege, are enemies of all Czechoslovakian citizens, not simply of the nation's communist leaders. According to a Czech intelligence agent sent abroad to infiltrate emigrant groups, the emigres (working through RFE) are engaged in "criminal

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activities" directed against Czechoslovakia. Yet, we are assured, these people will not succeed because they have very little real influence in the West and optimistic emigre statements regarding the prospects for change in Czechoslovakia are dismissed as fantasies such as those embraced by the Soviet emigre Kerensky who died in New York at the age of 91, after waiting fifty-five years for a "change" in the USSR. The return of one well-known emigre, Jiri Sotola, former First Secretary of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, was heralded as a lesson for those remaining in exile. Sotola's return was described as proof of the hopelessness of the dissidents' cause and statements in which he denounced the "audacity with which some of the emigres are working against the interests of their own country ..." (note the attempted appeal to innate patriotic sentiment despite the regime's actual hostility towards nationalist ideologies) were given wide media coverage.(10)

Although the emigres are an irritation to the regime, it is the domestic opposition which receives the most regular attention. The most severe criticisms are directed at the intellectual component of this broad category of opposition forces. It was during the time of the "Prague Spring," Federal Premier Lubomir Strougal charges, that the intellectuals "came out against socialism and its fundamental values" and aided in the "destruction of the political system and the consciousness of our citizens." Strougal concedes that this error "continues to influence" official treatment of the intelligentsia.(11) Formation of Charter 77, a group indentified largely with Czech intellectuals, produced even more frenzied attacks on the intelligentsia. The Charter sees itself as an informal association of people who have widely differing convictions and emphasizes that it is not a platform for a political opposition. Nevertheless, official statements indicate that the regime cannot accept such a benign view of this group and its primary document, basically a statement demanding respect for human rights. The party daily described the Charterists as "elitists" who were becoming increasingly alienated from the majority of their fellow citizens(12) while Radio Prague singled out one of the founders, Vaclav Havel, as a tool of the Western news media" unleashed upon Czechoslovakia. Havel was even accused of collaboration with an American spy during the 1960s.(13)

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Authorities have worked to cultivate the impression that opposition to intellectual dissidents is not centered solely within the party but is in reality a broadly based popular movement. A 1975 radio commentary by Jaroslav Korinek, after describing the activities of those who are "blackening and disparaging the results of our peoples' selfless work," attempted to generate support for moves against intellectuals by warining that "even socialism cannot allow itself the luxury of tolerating the deliverate harming of society."(14) In 1977, the deputy head of the Czech Trade Union Congress joined the chorus by declaring that the trade unionists didn't accept lectures on human rights from those conspiring against socialism.(15) In preparation for the tenth annivarsary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Czech news media emphasized the "mass opposition" of Czech citizens to Dubĉek's regime as well as to the activities of the Charterists. The people of Czechslovakia, according to numerous official reports, were demanding that action be taken against those calling for changes in the country's political system.(16)

It would be incorrect to suggest that a union exists between intellectuals and workers in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there is considerable concern about the attitudes of this most important group, misgivings which are a product of reports that factories are suffering from a breakdown of labor discipline. While dissidents cite this as evidence of worker dissatisfaction with political conditions in post-1968 Czechoslovakia, authorities are vigorously attacking the numerous manifestations of poor labor discipline. One of the first indications of this effort was a 1973 amendment to the labor code intended to limit the consumption of alcohol at work.(17) The People's Control Committee detailed some additional problems posed by shortcomings of labor discipline, beginning with reports of a survey in Prague indicating that workers regularly leave shops and factories to do personal errands. As much as 20% of the force arrives late for work, the Committee charged, and many people stretch weekends by leaving work at noon on Friday. Authorities stress that these difficulties actually began during the Dubcek era, not afterward as dissidents suggest.(18) The party has demonstrated its unhappiness with the situation by complaining about the poor quality of Czech merchandise and charging that workers over-

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estimate their own worth because of the national "labor shortage."(19) The party does not limit itself to complaints alone and declares that those who fail will "draw the appropriate consequences from poor and inefficient work" as authorities "penalize the remuneration of funds ..."(20)

Czech dissidents, of course, place a political interpretation on the workers' lack of discipline. Writing in the emigre journal *Listy*, Karel Honza insists that workers have "absolutely rejected all Bolsheviks, communists, and Husakists." Numerous factory militias, he says, have been disbanded because of a shortage of reliable cadres, and party organizations in factories are experiencing sharp drops in membership. According to Honza, the only luxury enjoyed by workers is the joy of loafing on the job or the privilege of sneaking off to perform extra jobs elsewhere to supplement salaries received at the factory(21) The appearance of workers' names on Charter 77 is another indication that there is at least some substance to dissident claims of worker support for demands expressed by intellectuals.

If the 1960s, culminating with Dubĉek's ascendency within the party, were a time of gradual erosion of the regime's absolute monopoly, the 1970s were an epoch of systematic reassertion of that authority. While there have been some questions regarding the role of many workers during this time, it is the intelligentsia — artists, writers, teachers, and scientists — who have borne the brunt of the party's attack. Anti-intellectual attitudes, of course, were common in the early communist years and even became more or less institutionalized. However, in the era of normalization, they have become almost compulsory.

Jiri Pelikan has described the anti-intellectualism of Husak's Czechoslovakia in *Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe* and outlines the far-reaching effects of this policy. Declaring the Czechoslovakian case to be an example of a revolution which has "eaten its own children," Pelikan discusses the fates of the almost 500,000 communists driven from the party following Gustav Husak's elevation to Dubĉek's position. These disillusioned people seldom became the targets of outright terror, but were instead subjected to subtle political and material pressures. This relatively restrained approach helped accomplish the regime's primary objective; consolidation

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of its political power, without stimulating more intense opposition to the process of normalization.(22)

The stage was set for the 'purification' of the Party at a meeting of the Party Control Commission in 1975 with a call for the Party "to be more demanding" of its membership and to improve members' discipline and education.(23) Even before this formal statement there were numerous demands in the press for an improvement in the quality of Party membership and for elimination of members who were unenergetic, opportunistic, or inclined toward "individualistic behavior." For those who viewed the process as routine, one party journal cautioned that this continuing effort is not "a mere administrative exercise."(24)

Removal from the ranks of the Party is not the only sanction applied to those viewed as offensive to current authorities. Several cases will illustrate the methods used against such individuals. Cestmir Cisar, for example, former Party secretary for Brno, was relegated to a subordinate position in the Prague office for the care of monuments. The Prime Minister from Dubĉek's era, Oldrich Cernik, was assigned a position as director of a coal supply operation, while Central Committee member Milan Silhan became a bulldozer driver in South Bohemia. Two other prominent figures from the Prague Spring, Presidium member Dr. Zdenek Mlynar and Major General Vaclav Prohlik, a close Dubĉek associate, were similarly reassigned to non-political positions. Mlynar became an entomologist at the National Museum and Prohlik found employment as an underground construction worker.(25) Journalist Vera Stovickova not only lost her position as a journalist, but was even deprived of her job as a charwoman in a home for retired professors when the personnel director learned of her political background.(26)

Even those of the Dubĉek era who indicated that they accepted the inevitability of normalization and attempted to co-operate with post-1968 authorities have been treated with caution. The best example of this in Jiri Hajek, former foreign minister as well as a literary critic responsible for initiation of the move towards cultural liberalization in the 1960s. Having later in the decade become alarmed at the rapid pace of this process, he had begun to exert efforts to restrict liberal trends, and had been appointed editor-in-chief of the new Party weekly

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Tvorba in 1969. However, Hajek did not reject his own brand of restrained liberalism, and in 1976, after supporting publication of a story involving a physician who committed suicide following his expulsion from the Party and his subsequent loss of employment, he was unceremoniously removed from this post. Following the loss of this post, Hajek found himself increasingly isolated from anyone who might publicize his arguments against the Husak regime. Two Dutch journalists who visited him were actually detained by the police and released only due to the influence of the Dutch foreign minister. In September, 1980, Hahek was arrested, interrogated and held for 48 hours, apparently because officials viewed him as a supporter of the Polish workers' strike.(27)

Outright dismissal from privileged jobs is not the only sort of material pressure brought to bear against opposition elements, particularly writers. Dilia, the state copyright agency, is the primary instrument used in denying writers the opportunity of publishing unacceptable views, either at home or abroad. Dilia's utility as an agency of repression was illustrated by its denial of permission for playright Pavel Kohout to publish his works in Czechoslovakia or West Germany where his former publisher had arranged for several of his plays to be performed.(28) Kohout's case, of course, was by no means exceptional and as Dilia's efforts have been supplemented by purges from the membership of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, many writers find themselves without an outlet for their work. In a nine year period following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the membership of the writers' organization declined from about 400 to 164, meaning that more and more writers are effectively prevented from presenting their views to the public. Similar pressures have been applied within the Slovak Writers' Union, which expelled, Hana Ponicka, the authoress of numerous childrens' books, declaring that she would henceforth be forbidden to publish anything.(29)

These actions are designed not simply to ensure that the general public is denied access to literature that might be critical of the regime, but are also intended as punishments for artists who challenge the political establishment. Thus, punishment rather than censorship was clearly the motive when a popsinger, Marta Kubisova, was denied the right to perform following the appearance of her signature on a Charter 77 document,

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since State security officials implied she would be allowed to continue to sing provided only that she withdrew her support for the petition.(30) Political unreliability, rather than aesthetic distaste is the reason why, of the 6,000 pop musicians registered in Czechoslovakia, only 3,000 were being allowed to give performances by 1978!(31

Expulsions from the party and economic pressures are not the only weapons in the regime's arsenal of weapons to be used against dissidents. Deprivation of citizenship is a device that is also used to punish as well as intimidate. When Pavel Kohout was denied permission to produce his plays, many expected that he would travel to West Germany in violation of the ban. However, had he done so, he would have placed himself in a position where he could have been deprived of his citizenship in absentia. Later, he was allowed to go to Austria where he stayed for almost a year with assurance that he could return when he wanted to do so. However, when Kohout tried to return in 1979, he found that he was barred from the country and stripped of his citizenship. This threat can severely limit the options of dissidents who, like former Central Committee Secretary Zdenek Mlynar and historian Jan Tesar, find themselves without employment at home and wish to take a job abroad. Authorities threatened them with loss of citizenship if they chose to leave the country in spite of the fact that they were unable to work at home. Tesar's case was especially acute since he was ill but receiving none of the state aid to which he was entitled.(32) Some deprivations of citizenship are more abrupt. In 1980, script writer Jiri Polak, a son of Ota Sik, was unceremoniously expelled from the country, along with his wife and son, and stripped of his citizenship.(33)

The security forces are much more ingenuous than in the past and numerous novel forms of harassment have been adopted in order to make life difficult for dissidents. For example, in 1973, Kohout was forcibly taken from his home by two male nurses and confined in a jail-like room in the disease isolation ward of Bulovka Hospital. He and his wife were kept in absolute isolation for more than a week after being informed that they may have contracted a human strain of "foot and mouth disease." In 1977 Kohout was ordered to move from his Prague home to a much smaller place because his old house was being designated as an "historical edifice."(34)

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In the case of Josef Smrkovsky, one of the leading figures in Dubĉek's government, authorities took steps to prevent his grave from becoming a symbol of resistance. Following his death in 1974, authorities carried out measures designed to prevent supporters from making his funeral into a political protest. Funeral announcements were delayed in the mails. Traffic to the funeral was rerouted and diverted to make people late. No speeches were allowed at the service and only the most remote cemetary in the Prague area was made available. Several days after the funeral, the urn containing his ashes was stolen from the cemetary, apparently by the authorities themselves. After its recovery, also by the authorities, Smrkovsky's family learned that reburial in the Prague cemetary would be forbidden. Instead, the ashes were placed in an unmarked grave in his native village, Velenka.(35)

In addition to these unique approaches, the security forces also practice the methods which are by now traditional in their application to East European dissidents. Homes are entered by policemen at inconvenient and unanticipated hours, manuscripts are confiscated, and surveillance is constant. Imprisonment frequently results from these efforts to suppress opposition. Shortly after the appearance of Charter 77, a number of individuals associated with it were placed under house arrest. Apparently authorities resorted to this relatively restrained form of arrest simply in the hope of preventing dissidents from making contact with people who could publicize their complaints, especially during the conference of West European communists on "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in 1977.(36) Many other arrests followed, of course, and these were frequently followed by imprisonment. The historian Jan Tesar reported that while he was in prison he was brutally beaten and Jan Patocka, a non-Marxist philosopher, died from a cerebral hemorrhage following his eleven hour interrogation in March, 1977.(37) Dissidents then organized an underground study group known as the "Jan Patocka University." A series of police raids have been launched against this small, informal group and in 1979, for the first time, authorities arrested one of the numerous visiting Western academics, Norwegian economics professor Thorolf Rafto.(38) Efforts to crush the "university," which serves as an intellectual outlet for young people denied admission to formal universities because of the

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political shortcomings of themselves or their families, continued into 1980. Several Western scholars, including philosopher Dr. Anthony Kenny, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, have been detained along with dozens of Czech citizens. Although these detentions have been accompanied by frequent brutality, such as that applied to the philosopher Julius Tomin who on at least two occasions has been apprehended by police for attempting to lecture on Aristotle, there have usually been no formal charges or extended imprisonment resulting from the actions.(39)

When trials and imprisonment do follow arrests, the victims do not always receive only the traditional confinement. Zdenek Kastak, for example, who was charged with "anti-state incitement" when he wrote complaints to several newspapers, was sentenced to ten months in jail to be followed by an indefinite period of psychiatric care.(40) Nor are the charges always so traditional. Several Charterists have prison sentences of as much as two years for disseminating recordings of a Prague musical group known as "The Plastic People of the Universe."(41)

By the end of this decade, actions against the church in Czechoslovakia were also increasing because of the sympathy shown by many religious leaders for the aims of Charter 77. Late in 1979 four Catholic priests who had already been denied permission to function as pastors were arrested on charges of maintaining contacts with organizations abroad. Two Catholic laymen were arrested at the same time and, along with the priests, charged with operation of a secret print shop. The shop was producing copies of Solzhenytsin's *Gulag Archipelago* and an anthology about Pope John Paul II. Czech law provides for sentences of up to eight years for such actions.(42) By 1980, the regime had almost entirely eliminated dissident religious activists and all religious organizations and activities were under significant restrictions.

Stalinist terror policies remain available as a weapon at the disposal of Marxist leaders determined to protect their positions; nevertheless, resort to these by the Husak regime is strictly limited and selective. The repressive actions of the Party and its agencies are not an effort to enforce total mobilization or politicization of all segments of society, but merely to insure that undesirable elements stay out of politics. Gen-

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erally, the victims of Czechoslovakia's repression are socially "marginalized." They are sentenced to political, legal, or economic deaths, not to the firing squad or the hangman. Deaths, such as that of Patocka, or the apparent attempt on the life of charter signatory Anna Marvanova in October, 1980,(43) seem to be the result of excesses which are not intended as part of policy. Husak and his supporters would prefer to see the oppostion leaders as exiles rather than martyrs.

The effort to insure exclusive control also focuses on preventing successful organizational efforts by the dissidents. As a result, the "Patocka University," perhaps regarded as an effort to establish a counter-regime educational institution, however limited in scope, seems to receive particularly careful attention. Other dissident responses to official pressures, such as the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), an undertaking which has been widely discussed in the West, are equally compelling targets. Finally, authorities recognize the importance of communication among dissidents and attempt to restrict their ability to keep in touch with each other. This is true not only for those in Czechoslovakia, who frequently find phones disconnected and driver's licenses revoked, but also for those with links abroad. However, possibly out of fear of international reaction, authorities have done less to inhibit Czech dissidents from co-operating with Polish groups sympathetic to their cause, and in March, 1980, Polish dissidents staged a hunger strike to protest the trials of several Charter 77 activists.(44)

Yet, the security measures carried out by Czech authorities to protect the totalitarian character of state socialism, have not been without cost internationally. The negative international reaction to the Czechoslovakian process of normalization is well-documented and persuasively demonstrates the price of repression. Perhaps most important is the fact that the protests have come not only from anti-communists and non-communists but also from numerous Western communist parties, whose ability to make converts has been endangered, and the appeal of the world communist movement has been inhibited.

Nevertheless the message of normalization for Eastern Europe is that the prospects for a meaningful deradicalization of the communist party states of Eastern Europe are not good.

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Until there has been time to judge the process of change set in motion in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Czech case gives us our best and most recent opportunity to evaluate efforts to humanize socialism. The lesson of this decade of normalization is that pluralism remains alien to the socialist system. The push for a monopoly of power continues to be the strongest impulse driving the Czech party-state system and there is little likelihood of a reversal of this situation.

The impact of normalization on the closed societies of Eastern Europe is not easily determined. If dissident sources are correct, Czechoslovakia has suffered from this process by a drop in popular morale that is even reflected in general worker inefficiency. Complaints in the government media indicate that there is a problem, but we cannot be certain if it should be attributed to the causes detailed by the dissidents. Yet, we can calculate the impact in terms of a cultural and scientific loss for Czechoslovakia. Reading a list of the people forced into exile abroad dramatically illustrates the price the nation pays for normalization. Dozens of the most promising writers, journalists, scientists, and other creative people now reside in Western Europe rather than their homeland. That same loss can also be calculated by considering the numbers of people not allowed to contribute to Czech science and culture because of their political "unreliability." Instead of producing plays or conducting scientific research, hundreds of people are forced to work in less sensitive areas totally outside of their disciplines. Such a price is too great for any nation but it is even more excessive in the case of Czechoslovakia for it further compounds the tragedy of what happened in 1968.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Jean-Francois Revel, *The Totalitarian Temptation* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1977), pp. 27-28.

(2) This is not to suggest that the consumerist approach has not yielded some results. In 1968 only 69% of Prague's working families had washing machines; today all have at least a manual machine and 40% have automatic machines. Ownership of refrigerators has risen from 42% to 99%. *Rude Pravo*, November 8, 1980, p. 1.

(3) *Slovak Pravda*, August 9, 1974, p. 2.

(4) "Religion under "Real Socialism'", *Radio Free Europe Background Report*, No. 123, May 31, 1979, pp. 7-11.

(5) *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1977, p. 1.

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(6) *Ibid.*, May 8, 1974, p. 3.
(7) *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Eastern Europe* (hereafter noted as SWB), No. 4776, December 9, 1974, pp. B/1-2.
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(12) *Rude Pravo*, April 9, 1977, p. 2.
(13) *Ibid.*, April 12, 1977, p. 2.
(14) *SWB*, No. 4955, July 15, 1975, p. B/2.
(15) *Rude Pravo*, April 12, 1977, p. 2.
(16) *Ibid.*, July 30, 1977, pp. 2-3.
(17) *SWB*, No. 4429, October 20, 1973, p. B/3.
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(19) *Rude Pravo*, June 14, 1974, p. 3.
(20) *Ibid.*, April 26, 1980, p. 3.
(21) *Listy*, No. 4, May, 1975, p. 5.
(22) Jiri Pelikan, *Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe*, (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), pp. 35-39.
(23) *Rude Pravo*, June 3, 1975, p. 2.
(24) *Bratislava Pravda*, August 24, 1979, p. 1.
(25) *Die Welt*, August 21, 1973, p. 22.
(26) *Listy*, No. 4, 1974, p. 8.
(27) "Human Rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe", U.S. Department of State, Current policy No. 224, September 16, 1980, pp. 3-4.
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(30) *Radio Free Europe: Czechoslovakian Situation Report*, No. 8, March 2, 1977, p. 1.
(31) *Ibid.*, No. 1, January 11, 1978, p. 2.
(32) *Ibid.*, No. 32, October 17, 1979, p. 1 and No. 16, May 3, 1977, pp. 2-4.
(33) *L'Humanite*, October 14, 1980, p. 12.
(34) *Radio Free Europe; Czechoslovakian Situation Report*, No. 10, March 16, 1977, p. 1.
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(37) *Ibid.*, No. 10, March 16, 1977, pp. 1-2.
(38) *The Guardian*, September 7, 1979, p. 7.
(39) *New Statesman*, March 28, 1980, p. 2 and *Daily Telegraph*, April 14, 1980, p. 1.
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CONTEMPORARY SOVIET MODERNIZATION AND ITS ETHNIC IMPLICATIONS: 1959-1979

By Nicholas Dima

Almost since its inception, the Soviet Union has pursued a steady process of socialist "modernization," implying among other things planned industrialization, urbanization, and high levels of education. One of the most significant features of this process is a massive shift of population from rural to urban areas. This process, however, has affected various geographic regions and units of the USSR very differently. Also, the population implications of this process of "modernization" have varied greatly from region to region and from one ethnic group to another.

In general, it has been the Russian-speaking regions and the Russian people as a nationality that have experienced the most rapid changes, entailing rural depopulation, while the non-Russian regions and nationalities, mostly in the southern part of the Soviet Union, have experienced slower modernization accompanied by an increase in their rural population.

This essay discusses the implications of the Soviet social modernization by analyzing the 1959-1979 intercensal period and focusing on those major nationalities recognized by union republics. At the same time, we shall briefly discuss the main causes of differential modernization with emphasis upon rural-to-urban migration. It also sheds some light on the discrepancies existing between the Russian/Slavic peoples and the southern, mostly non-European nationalities from Central Asia. Demographic statistics relating to the major nationalities and their evolution over the last 20 years are shown in the two tables included in the text.

The difficulty of interpreting Soviet population data, and particularly ethnic data, should be stressed from the beginning. Since the first modern Russian census was taken in 1897, the Soviet demographic data have continuously decreased in volume and quality. The 1897 census, for example, contains 89 volumes. The first Soviet census taken in 1926, probably by people of the old school of statistics, was published in 66 thick volumes. It contains detailed data, and is similar to the

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1897 census, having parallel headings in French. The next census, taken in 1939, was never published. Probably, it would have demonstrated the disastrous results of Stalin's cruel policies. The 1959 census was printed in 16 volumes, one for each union republic plus a summary volume. The 1970 census was allotted only 7 volumes, and the 1979 census has not been published yet. Knowledgeable people say that it may be condensed into only 2 volumes, or perhaps not be published at all. The census undoubtedly reveals a downtrend in the number of Russian and Slavic people in the USSR.

Aside from the scarcity of data, particularly in the field of fertility, mortality and natural increase, and even more so in respect of nationality, the data are erratic, incomplete and inconsistent, and consequently cross-references are difficult to make.

There is also an additional problem for those seeking data on the Soviet nationalities. Persons of mixed parentage can declare their nationality to be Russian if one parent is Russian. It also seems that linguistically assimilated individuals can declare themselves to be Russians, particularly if they reside outside their own republic. Therefore, it is believed that millions of non-Russians declare themselves to be Russians for convenience and personal interest, although they are not ethnic Russians. Since better sources are not available, researchers must nevertheless do their best to untangle the facts from the available Soviet population data.

Between 1959 and 1979, the Soviet population increased by 25 percent, growing from 209 million to 262 million. However, while the rural population declined by 10 million, from 109 to 99 million, the urban population increased by 64% from 100 million to 164 million.(1) The urban increase resulted primarily from rural-to-urban migration; from the natural increase of the urban population itself; and from the reclassification of certain rural areas as urban settlements.(2) Although the ratio between the rural and urban population changed in a reasonable way on a Soviet-wide basis, it changed greatly from one region to another. According to Soviet data, between 1959 and 1970, 3 million people left the rural areas every year to settle in cities, though half of them failed to integrate into urban life and returned to their villages. Nevertheless, the proportion of the Soviet rural population decreased from 52

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percent in 1959 to 44 percent in 1970, and then to 38 percent at the time of the last census in 1979.(3) These overall figures, however, hide the huge disproportion which developed between regions, republics and nationalities. They also hide the great differences in the rate of regional modernization in the USSR, and their socioeconomic and demographic consequences.

By and large, the European USSR and Western Siberia have urbanized rapidly, losing rural population correspondingly, while the non-European USSR and the southernmost European regions have urbanized at a much slower pace, and their rural population has increased. Thus, between 1959 and 1970, the rural population increased by 37 percent in Soviet Central Asia, while it decreased by 17 percent in the Central Economic Region of the RSFSR (the Russian Federation). Within these two extremes of change, the other Soviet regions and republics have experienced a multitude of rural population changes, from great increases to real depopulation. Roughly, the central and western parts of the Soviet Union lost close to 8 million rural inhabitants, mostly rural Russians, while the southern areas increased their rural population by about 8 million, almost exclusively non-Russian peasants. For example, the Central Economic Region alone lost 2 million rural inhabitants, the majority of them young educated individuals. In contrast, Central Asia increased its rural population by 4 million people within the same period of time, all of them young, non-Russian, Moslem inhabitants.(4)

Applying a "push-pull" model of migration refined with "personal factors" and "intervening obstacles" to an array of over 30 socioeconomic and demographic variables, analyzing them according to a set of 26 economic regions and union republics, and subjecting them to rank correlations and factor analyses, we arrive at the following conclusions as to the principal causes of differential migration and especially village to city migration:(5)

1) The most important cause leading Soviet people to depart from the land appears to be regional modernization, defined partially as urbanization and industrialization. These factors reinforce each other, offering a large variety of employment opportunities, and act as "pull" factors attracting people from the countryside – in the absence of political barriers to migration.

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2) Next in importance is a personal factor, education, which is an obstacle to modernization when deficient.

3) Ethnic factors are also very important, these being generally linked to education. By and large, if a non-Russian is educated and speaks Russian, he faces no barrier to emigration from rural areas. However, if a non-Russian does not speak Russian and has little education, his migration chances are restricted because most Soviet cities are Russified.

4) Agricultural conditions, per se, treated as "push" factors, do not seem to be important in emigration from the land, probably because in the Soviet Union agricultural technology is not sufficiently advanced to force rural emigration.

IMPLICATIONS

After almost 60 years of continuous effort, the Soviet Union is becoming a mature industrial society with all the attendant intricate traits, such as ethnic and cultural complexity, higher educational levels, social stratification, urbanization, complexity of community organization, social mobility, and rural depopulation. Consequently, in the perspective of industrial development, these elements should result in certain already established patterns of effects, "regardless of the political system governing the USSR."(6)

The most important consequences of modernization, of which rural-to-urban migration and rural population changes are integral parts, are of a socioeconomic and demographic nature, and in multinational countries, such as the USSR, of an ethnic and even racial nature. This urbanization occurs primarily at the expense of the rural population. Demographically, however, "the fact that migrants are not a representative cross-section of the population they leave or the population to which they move," has obvious implications.(7) In the Soviet Union, it has a discernable impact upon the age and sex structure of the population; upon its fertility and natural increase, and upon the labor force. More importantly, since "internal migration within multinational states is a potentially disjunctive force,"(8) in the USSR it also has great ethnic implications.

Age and Sex Implications

Out-migration from the rural areas of the Soviet Union is obviously dominated by people in the working force age-group,

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especially young males in their twenties. On a Soviet-wide basis, for example, the 20 to 29 year old rural age-group decreased from 17 percent in 1959 to only 9 percent in 1970. The decline in the proportion of young people within the whole rural population has been, however, extremely uneven throughout the USSR. Whereas in most Russian European regions the population in this age-group decreased in absolute numbers by as many as 30 to 45 percent, in Central Asia it decreased by only 12 percent and in Kazakhstan only by 9 percent.(9) The uneven decline in the proportions of the young rural Soviet population, actually the potential parents and the strongest component of the labor force, has further ethnodemographic consequences.

Fertility and Natural Increase Implications

"Urbanization created a new social milieu wherein high fertility and large family size conflicted with levels of living, aspirations for mobility, and life-style."(10) Following a high rate of urbanization, the Soviet crude birth rates went down steadily after the Second World War, and more evenly and visibly within the last 20 years. In 1970, for example, in most Russian and Ukrainian regions which had experienced both industrialization and continuous rural out-migration the crude birth rates had already fallen to 15 per thousand and under. In the southern republics, by contrast, and notably in Central Asia, where most local nationalities are still rural and do not emigrate from the land, the crude birth rates were more than twice as high, or between 32 and 37 per thousand. In 1980 crude birth rates were 18.3 for the USSR as a whole, 15.0 for the RSFSR and between 30 and 37 per thousand for Central Asia.(11)

Consequent to these differential birth rates, the natural increase of the Soviet regions and republics has been extremely uneven, as well. While the overall increase of the Soviet population was approximately 10 per thousand in 1970, the rate of increase varied from 6 to 7 per thousand in the RSFSR and the Ukraine (with a record low of 4 per thousand in Latvia) to a high of 25 to 30 per thousand in all Central Asian republics.(12) Such an increase, five times higher than in Russia proper, is equivalent to the "explosive" increase presently characteristic of the third world.

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Labor Force Implications

The labor force of the Soviet population has also been greatly and unequally affected by the Soviet pattern of modernization and out-migration from agriculture. In this respect, the USSR can be divided into three large regions: 1) the European part, except for Moldavia (former Romanian Bessarabia) and North Caucasus, has experienced heavy out-migration, generally coupled with industrial development, and has already begun to feel some labor shortages; 2) Siberia and the Far East have experienced heavy out-migration from rural and urban areas as well, have undergone industrial development, and already have great labor shortages in both rural areas and cities; and 3) Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Transcaucasus, North Caucasus and Moldavia have experienced little rural out-migration, less industrial development, and consequently have large labor resources. In fact, these southern republics are regarded as the main Soviet labor reserves for the present and future as well. During the next decade the labor force will continue to increase in the south, particularly in the countryside, while European Russia, Siberia and the Far East will have great labor deficits. Under these circumstances, Soviet planners and demographers are already advocating that population "resettlement is a matter of great national importance" for the future of the USSR.(13) Nevertheless, such "resettlements" will have profound ethnic consequences, and may create difficult to reconcile political tensions.

Ethnic Implications

The more than 130 officially recognized Soviet nationalities are "characterized by different levels of cultural, social and economic achievements."(14) Obviously, the more urban a nationality is the more population redistribution from villages to cities it has undergone. At the same time, education and employment in industry and services, all of them associated with general modernization, grow with urbanization, while the Soviet rural environment generates economic stagnation and poverty.(15)

The Russians, the Slavs and generally the European nationalities have modernized more rapidly than the non-Russians, especially more than those nationalities located in the "rural" south. The Russians are the most urbanized major Soviet

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TABLE I
MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES: 1959-1979.
(Soviet Census definition)

Nationality	Total Population in millions		Percent of Total		Percent Increase
	1959	1979	1959	1979	1959/79
Russians	114,114	137,397	54.7	52.4	20.4
Ukrainians	37,253	42,347	17.8	16.1	13.7
Uzbeks	6,015	12,456	2.9	4.8	107.1
Belorussians	7,913	9,463	3.8	3.6	19.6
Kazakhs	3,622	6,556	1.7	2.5	81.0
Azerbaydzhanis	2,940	5,477	1.4	2.1	86.3
Armenians	2,787	4,151	1.3	1.6	48.9
Georgians	2,692	3,571	1.3	1.4	32.7
Moldavians*	2,214	3,097	1.1	1.2	40.0
Lithuanians	2,326	2,851	1.1	1.1	22.6
Tadzhiks	1,397	2,898	0.7	1.1	107.4
Turkmens	1,002	2,028	0.5	0.8	102.4
Kirgiz	969	1,906	0.5	0.7	96.7
Latvians	1,400	1,439	0.7	0.5	2.8
Estonians	989	1,020	0.5	0.4	3.1
Tatars	4,968	6,317	2.4	2.4	27.2
Jews	2,268	1,811	1.1	0.7	–

* Moldavians/Romanians (Soviet definition)

Sources: *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda* (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), Vol. IV, pp. 9-15; *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 7, 1980, pp. 41-42.

TABLE 2

MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES: 1970
(Urbanization, Education, Marital Status and Proportion of Children)

Nationality	Urbanization (percent)	Education (per thousand)	Female Marriages*	Children 0-15 (percentage of total population)
Russians	68.0	256	91	28.1
Ukrainians	48.5	237	112	25.7
Uzbeks	24.9	199	217	51.5
Belorussians	43.7	209	76	23.3
Kazakhs	26.7	191	123	49.1
Azerbaydzhanis	39.7	226	183	50.1
Armenians	64.7	315	152	36.9
Georgians	44.0	405	134	30.9
Moldavians	20.4	108	119	33.9
Lithuanians	46.7	164	54	28.5
Tadzhiks	26.0	170	249	52.2
Turkmens	31.0	172	191	51.1
Kirgiz	14.6	190	201	51.8
Latvians	52.7	239	59	21.7
Estonians	55.1	242	49	21.2

* Married women of 16 to 19 years of age per 1,000 women.

Sources: *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 goda* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962), p. 190. *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda* (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), Vol. IV.

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nationality. (Table 2) In 1970, for example, 68 percent of all Russians are urban as compared to only 15 percent of all Uzbeks in this category. In addition, between 1959 and 1970, the Russians and the other Soviet Slavs urbanized about twice as fast as the southern non-Slavic nationalities.(16) This trend widened the gap between these peoples, rather than bridging it, and has continued.

Furthermore, the Russians and the other more urbanized nationalities also enjoy much higher levels of education than the little educated southern ethnic groups. In 1970, for example, as many as 256 Russians per thousand had at least a middle education, as compared with only 108 Moldavians, 170 Tadzhiks and 172 Turkmen per thousand falling into this category, respectively.(17)

With regard to modernization and population change, even Soviet writers, who tried for a long time to formulate population laws unique to communist societies, now recognize that the same process takes place in the USSR as takes place elsewhere. At the beginning of the Soviet era, Marxist thinkers advocated equal development of all nationalities and regions, foreseeing "the elimination of nationality, both as a material and as a psychological factor," once differences were eliminated and social classes dissolved.(18) Contrary to their expectations, the nationality question has become an important issue in the Soviet Union. In this respect, Suslov, then the party's leading ideologist, identified three antagonisms existing in the USSR: *national antagonism, rural-urban antagonism*, and *white-blue collar antagonism.* Teresa Harmstone comments that these antagonisms reflect "the growth of pluralism and class differentiation in an increasingly developing and modernizing Soviet society."(19)

A number of recent Soviet articles have stated that Soviet ethno-demographic processes are similar to those occurring in other countries. According to Pokshishevskiy, urbanization promotes assimilation on the one hand, but on the other hand it sharpens ethnic awareness. Referring to capitalist countries, the Soviet author states that such increases in ethnic consciousness could open the way to ethnic clashes.(20) As Szporluk comments, "The Soviet experience suggests that, despite the pressure for assimilation, urbanization and industrialization have produced unassimilated, though modernized non-Russian

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cadres."(21) On the one hand, non-Russian rural nationalities are ethnically strong because they are able to better preserve their traditional values in the countryside; on the other hand, the Soviet cities are themselves becoming centers of national culture and consciousness. Pokshishevskiy even suggests that, "in the USSR it is now the city, perhaps more than the countryside, that has become the 'carrier of the ethnos'."(22)

The current Soviet ethno-demographic trend shows the ethnic Russians at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the other Soviet ethnic and racial groups, and this will certainly have important future implications. The Russians are clearly more modernized than other Soviet peoples, but the less modernized nationalities marry earlier, have large families (particularly in the countryside), and therefore increase more rapidly. Modern, urbanized, educated Soviet nationalities, such as the Russians, marry later, have small families and increase in number only slightly, if at all. Between 1959 and 1979, the Russians increased by only 1 percent annually, whereas Central Asians as a whole increased by some 5 percent annually, or almost five times as fast. Consequently, the Russian population is aging: only 28 percent of the Russians were under 15 years of age in 1970. By comparison, about 52 percent of the Central Asian nationalities were under 15 years of age in 1970. (Table 2)

According to the 1979 census, children 0 to 9 years of age made up 16.8 percent of the entire Soviet population. In the Russian Republic, however, the figure was only 14.8 percent while in Central Asia it was 29 to 30 percent.(23) "Since these children will in turn become members of the armed forces, workers and parents, they will thus determine much of the future character of Soviet society."(24) Increasing numbers will definitely bolster the assertiveness of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union.

The proportion of Russians in the total Soviet population is clearly decreasing, while the non-Russians are increasing correspondingly, especially in Central Asia. Projecting into the future the current fertility and natural increase, it is logically expected that by the end of the century the Russian proportion of the Soviet population will fall below 50 percent. Feshbach has forecasted that by the year 2000 the Soviet Union will have approximately 300 million people of whom only 140 million or 46.7 percent will be Russians. By com-

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parison, the Soviet Moslem population, now 44 million or 16.7 percent, will increase to 64 million or 21.3 percent of the Soviet population.(25)

This trend has already become obvious within the Soviet labor force, particularly among its young members. Before the end of the century, the Russians will comprise only some 40 percent of the Soviet labor force and about 30 to 35 percent of its young members. At the same time, before the end of the century only one in four or even five new draftees in the Soviet military will be Russian, most of them being "brown" or "yellow" recruits from the rural Soviet south. The future "red" army will become a rather "yellow" army. Certain specialists have already begun to speak of this process as the "yellowing" of the Soviet military.(26) Such a perspective is not likely to satisfy the Russians, but there is little they can do about it. Demographic processes follow socioeconomic realities rather than ideological policies. In addition, the socio-economic forces presently at work are not likely to change in the near future, thus the ethno-demographic gap between the Russians and the non-Russian nationalities will continue to widen, rather than to narrow.

It is also politically significant that the rapid demographic increase of the non-Russians, coupled with their increasing education, may tend to sharpen their ethnic awareness in the future rather than level it off. Since ethnic consciousness is ever-present in multinational states, and particularly so at times when there is an "opportune moment politically to overcome long-standing denial of privilege;"(27) and since ethnic consciousness also implies political consciousness, it is to be expected that at some point in the future the Russian domination of the Soviet Union will be strongly challenged by the non-Russian nationalities.

To some extent, the ethnic conflict has already started. A number of Soviet Moslem soldiers defected to the Moslem side in early 1980 when they were sent to fight in Afghanistan, leading the Soviet military leaders to replace most of the Central Asian troops in the Soviet forces in Afghanistan by soldiers of European, chiefly Russian and Slavic, stock. What will the next Soviet generation do? According to a recent Rand Corporation Study, the Soviet Army is already troubled with "racial and ethnic conflicts that could trigger large-scale

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defections in case of protracted war or serious military reversal."(28) In such a situation, the study, based upon in-depth research and numerous interviews with Soviet ex-servicemen, envisages such combat-related scenarios as ethnic clashes, racial riots and even mutinies based on ethnic grievances.

We have been accustomed to speaking of the Soviet bloc as "the Russians," despite the shock experienced by the civilian population of East Europe who found that the advancing World War II Soviet troops were often Asians and not Russians. Marxist ideology is color-blind as to the concept of race, conceiving of an age in which all races and all cultures will be eventually amalgamated into a single world-wide, common proletariat. Officially the emphasis is still on the concept of the "Soviet" man and the "Soviet" woman, with active nationalists of all ethnic groups, even Russian, facing the threat and often the reality of lengthy imprisonment. But the ethno-demographic realities of the Soviet Union may well prove to be stronger than Marxist theory, shaping and crucially influencing the future of the Soviet Union in ways which Marx and Lenin would never have expected.

FOOTNOTES

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THE POPULATION CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

By Jacob Meerman
and
Susan Hill Cochrane

The view persists that sub-Saharan Africa is underpopulated; that its economic growth will be accelerated if its population increases. This view is based on two arguments. First, that modernization (read: industrialization) is facilitated by large numbers of people because they make possible greater specialization and the application of productive modern techniques. Yet three quarters of the countries in the region have populations of less than ten million people. The second argument is that population density is low relative to arable land, which would be more productive if there were more people to work it.

Neither argument is really persuasive. Large numbers do not automatically lead to rapid economic development – the slow growth in India and Bangladesh testifies to this. The key element for economic growth is production stimulated by the effective demand of large markets. For small countries, these have to be export markets. But rising populations in sub-Saharan Africa have led primarily to economic growth based largely upon traditional village agriculture, and this has not increased per capita output. Population growth of this genre could actually reduce total cash income per head because of diminishing returns as more labor is applied to a less productive agriculture.

It is true that the density of population in the region is very low – on average less than one fifth of that in Asia. But in Asia, more modern technology and better natural conditions – irrigation and double cropping – permit families to cultivate small plots very intensively. In Africa many times more land per capita is needed for survival. Against this measure, much of the region is already crowded: unless new technologies and practices evolve, agricultural output can no longer increase in proportion to additional agricultural labor.

This article presents an opposite argument: sub-Saharan Africa – given its present institutions and endowments of capital and technology – is already dangerously close to overpopulation. The rapid growth in numbers projected for the next

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decades will greatly increase human misery and depress rather than promote economic development. Specifically, rapid population growth will have disastrous effects on the region's ability to increase exports and provide people with goods. In sub-Saharan Africa fertility either continues to be very high or is increasing, in part due to some decline in traditional practices that reduce fertility, such as prolonged breast-feeding or sexual abstinence. This situation and the expectation of declining mortality, due to better health care, imply that African population growth, which is already the most rapid in the world, may increase further. Population in sub-Saharan Africa is now about half that of India and a third of China (see chart). If fertility does not decline, in 33 years population will probably exceed that of India and be nearly equal to that of China. If fertility remains constant, in 40 years Kenya's population will increase five times to 81 million; Nigeria's will increase four-fold, to 341 million.

There are two main reasons why reduced fertility in the next few decades is unlikely in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. First, Africa has low literacy (particularly among girls), high infant and child mortality, and low urbanization. These suggest that existing fertility rates will persist well into the next century. But even if there is an improvement in the factors affecting fertility, these rates may still not decline. Many countries of the Middle East and Latin America have rates of urbanization, income, adult literacy, and child mortality which most African countries will not attain for many decades, yet their fertility levels persist at very high rates. This suggests that the projection for Africa based on constant fertility is more likely than that based on decreasing fertility. Second, average African fertility rates may even increase for the next 20 years or so. This has already happened in three of the four African countries for which we have adequate statistics. The reason for this is that Africa, perhaps more than any other large region of the world, has had fecundity reduced in the past by poor health. Assuming incomes rise and better diets are possible in future, then health will improve, and both fecundity and fertility may rise.

Food Supply

What are the implications of continuing and rapid popula-

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tion growth for African food supply? The region's cereal production is largely restricted to four grains – millett, sorghum, maize, and rice; but the volume of grain production is less, by weight, than 60 per cent of the production of roots and tubers. There are two main differences between the output of these crops in sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. First, yields per hectare are lower in Africa than elsewhere. Second, whereas yields elsewhere have increased in the last decade, in Africa they have generally been decreasing or largely constant.*

In the 1960s, agricultural production in the region increased largely in tandem with population; both grew at about 2.3 per cent annually. In the 1970s, however, agricultural output actually decreased some 1.3 percent a year, while population increased about 2.7 per cent a year. Food imports increased so rapidly that, by 1979, they absorbed more than 14 per cent of the foreign exchange generated by merchandise exports. Imported food grains (including food aid) represented 14 per cent of estimated grain production between 1977 and 1979. Since the urban population absorbed about 20 per cent of total production, and since most of the grain imported was consumed in the cities, it follows that food for African cities has been in large part imported. This growth of food imports is not a consequence of a more efficient division of labor of or an increasing specialization in export crops. The growth in output of all important African agricultural exports except tea has been negligible or negative since 1969-71.

Some of sub-Saharan Africa's poor export performance is exemplified by the case of Nigeria. With one third of the region's population, it was once the region's largest exporter of agricultural commodities. But since 1960, output in Nigerian agriculture has been decreasing. Today more than 90% of Nigeria's exports are petroleum. This has offset the rapid growth of agricultural exports – more than 6 per cent annually over 1969-79 – in countries such as the Ivory Coast and Malawi. But even excluding Nigeria, the region's agricultural growth rate in the last decade has been substantially less than that of population.

* The authors' comments on agricultural decline refer specifically to the Black countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and do not apply to the Republic of South Africa, whose agricultural development has continued positive, and which country now exports substantial quantities of food to neighboring Black African countries.

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Projections of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) suggest that unless there is a very substantial increase in agricultural yields in Africa, the ratio of food produced to food consumed will decline from 86 per cent in 1975 to 70 per cent in 1990 and to 61 per cent in the year 2000. This assumes population growth according to the United Nations' medium-growth projections, which are slightly below the constant fertility projections of the chart. Consequently, food imports, both commercial and food aid, will substantially increase as this century comes to an end. There will also be increased malnutrition among those groups who are poor and whose food supply is already very uncertain: in much of the Sahel; among landless laborers and the smaller farmers in densely populated rural areas; and among the urban poor in the poorer countries.

Causes of Low Productivity

This performance – falling yields on the farms, decreasing exports, and production falling behind population growth – has several causes. Some of these are of the nature of *force majeure*; in many countries disruptive civil strife has been associated with reduced output. But a second cause lies in diminishing returns. Land has, until recently, been the abundant factor of production. Cultivatable land, however, is becoming increasingly scarce. More marginal land has been brought under cultivation, either in zones of lower or uncertain rainfall or on slopes, and this has led to soil erosion and degradation.

Today, population pressure has brought diminishing returns to traditional agriculture in much of the Sahel and the savanna (Niger, Mauritania, the Mossi Plateau of Upper Volta, Senegal's northern groundnut basin, and northern Nigeria), in parts of East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda), Southern Africa (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), and parts of the West African forest belt (southeastern Nigeria, northern Benin, the western highlands of Cameroon, and the Central African Republic near Bangassou). In these, and other areas, the long fallow period has been shortened, undermining the regenerative power of soils. Consequently, less nutritious crops, which can be grown on very impoverished soils, are more widely cultivated. In the last two decades, production of "inferior" staples such as roots and tubers has increased as rapidly as that of the preferred grains. Fuelwood has become harder to find while overgrazing

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and disputes between cultivators and pastoral people are more frequent.

There is also the absence of the Green Revolution — the use of new high-yielding seeds and new technologies in agriculture that has led to dramatic increases in yields in most parts of the world. This new knowledge — at least for food grains — is largely inapplicable in sub-Saharan Africa; high-yielding rice varieties from Asia are rarely productive in Africa because of plant diseases. And with the exception of the eastern highlands of Kenya, the diffusion of hybrid maize is limited because existing high yield varieties are not suited to the ecology — the amount and variance in rainfall, sunlight, and transpiration — of most areas in Africa where maize is grown.

In addition to these long-term constraints on agriculture, pricing policy has frequently depressed production. The taxes on exports and other cash crops — including the depressing effects of surpluses collected by marketing boards and of overvalued exchange rates — frequently exceeding by more than half the value of the crop at the farm gate (that is, the export price less the costs of getting the crop from the farm to on board the ship). Governments have also subsidized the urban food grains, such as rice, wheat, and maize, by commandeering large quantities at low prices and in effect driving down the price and restricting the market for local foodstuffs. Frequently, some of the taxes on cash crops have been used for such subsidies. Even without financial subsidies on consumer prices, the widespread import of grains is usually duty-free and often at a very favorable exchange rate; so the consumer gets them at a bargain price. The effect is low prices for agricultural products, which may penalize local production and retard investment and innovation. Farmers with low incomes simply cannot pay for the inputs which most innovations require for their adoption. In general, therefore, some of Africa's agricultural stagnation is caused by government price, fiscal, and trade practices.

The widespread flight from rural areas to the cities — to usually dismal prospects for the unlettered majority — is in part explained by the very low returns to work in peasant agriculture, be these the results of population pressure per se or government policies. The flight is reinforced by the very low prestige of agricultural work. The educated are the first to leave. This rural "brain drain" further contributes to agricultural

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stagnation, which is exacerbated by extremely low investments in capital formation in African village agriculture.

The Need for Family Planning

The effect of population growth in diminishing returns to agriculture also lends urgency to the need for family plannning. The question facing policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa is not whether or not population will grow – it will grow rapidly – but when growth rates will slow. Experience in Asia and Latin America shows that both development and family planning programs can reduce fertility. China and Indonesia are examples of fertility declines far more rapid than those predicted on the basis of literacy, morality, and income. In these countries governments have accelerated the demographic transition to lower population growth rates by many means, including increasing access to modern contraceptives, mass education campaigns, and, in China, raising the marriage age.



In 1975, only 8 African countries had even weak family planning programs; they were rarely subsidized by their governments. Today 22 of the 37 African countries for which data are available support family planning. Nevertheless, there is little sense of urgency to the programs; nor have techniques or approaches been worked out that would be most suited to African circumstances. Emphasis on child-spacing may be one such approach. Child-spacing as a way to increase the chances of a child's survival is a basic and nearly universal ethic in African villages. It has always been accomplished through prolonged

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breast-feeding and sexual abstinence. Today, however, there is some use of contraceptives to ensure the required spacing. Thus the traditional ethic provides a rationale for incorporating family planning within maternal and child heath programs.

In general, population policy in Africa badly needs strengthening. This could be done in many ways. Family-planning advice could be recognized as the right of every couple, and providing such advice to all who desire it could be a pronounced basic goal of every government. Governments can encourage widespread family-planning services and supplies, including the availability of cheap or even free contraceptives.

Conclusion

In a sense most of the villages of tropical Africa have been suffering from overpopulation for many decades: notwithstanding abundant but not very productive land, in much of the region most villages barely produce enough to feed themselves. Droughts that cause food shortages and even famine are common occurrences. Diet is frequently very poor in general, and in particular during the weeks before the new harvest, and infant and toddler mortality is higher than anywhere else. Population growth in the next decade can only make this situation worse. Improvement in two areas — breaking the chain of population growth and stagnating agriculture — would help to reduce human misery in sub-Saharan Africa.

This subject has been more fully examined by the authors, with special relation to the problem of food supply, in *Finance and Development*, Volume 19, Number 3 (September 1982).

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THE FAMILY IN SWEDEN

By Eric Brodin

"The loosening of sexual life in Sweden can be seen not only as a means by the government to canalize youthful energies into what is regarded as harmless ways, but it also has the effect of loosening family ties. It is easier for the state to govern single individuals than groups — families are the oldest, strongest and most natural group, and it is therefore in the interest of a socialist government to dissolve it through a libertine sex life, just as tax legislation almost neccesitates women working with children collectively raised."

Bengt Löfstedt,
Professor, University of California at Los Angeles.

When Friedrich Engels wrote *The Origins of the State, Private Property, and Family,* he envisioned a world in which the family would be abolished. "The Bourgeois family," as he called it, "would be replaced by the powers of the state. In the very beginning of the first Communist society after the Bolshevist *coup d'etat* in Russia in November, 1971, legislation was initiated which would in effect have eliminated the family. But it had such disastrous results on the overall cohesion of society that the new Communist state subsequently proceeded to revise these laws so as to strengthen the family institution in subsequent legislation enacted in 1926, 1936, and 1944. It was realized that the desired Soviet State could not be built unless there were a degree of order in society, and that the family provided this basic element.

Yet Communists in the western countries, aided by willing fellow travellers, are today seeking to introduce the same kind of legislation which the Soviet Union abandoned at an early stage, because it found it so inimical to the organization of society. Their purpose is evidently to demoralize and weaken the family in the free nations of the west, thus undermining the very foundation of the free nations.

Aldous Huxley, in *Brave New World* (1) tells us something of which I am reminded when I visit my native country, Sweden, and see the evidence of the "sex society" over there. As the degree of economic and political freedom is being diminished,

(1) "Successively as the political and economic freedom diminished, sexual freedom increased, together with the freedom to day dream under the influence of narcotica and films, the subservient learn to accept that enslavement which has become their fate." Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World.*

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the Swedish people are instead being encouraged by libertine legislation to excessive license in the realm of sexual and moral behavior. As a form of compensation for other rights lost, they have available all the trappings of an openly pornographic society: in films, on radio and television, in magazines, in textbooks, in sex education material, and in all forms of media.

Herman Kling, one of the main apologists of Sweden's welfare state, argues that much can be achieved by simply introducing into legislation those laws which would transform society. This is what Kling said in a recent statement on this subject: "There is no reason to abstain from using the laws related to family and marriage as one of several tools in reforming and creating a society where each individual is economically self-sufficient."(2)

In the Swedish welfare society, sweeping changes in the social mores have been effected by legislation. While Sweden is the most outstanding example of a modern welfare state, having been created under optimally positive economic conditions, whatever is true of Sweden can be applied to the other Scandinavian countries, to Holland, to Great Britain, and indeed to much of the legislation which has been passed in the United States since the "Revolution of 1932."

Education is another of the tools whereby marxists seek to change social reality. Their goal is to create a new generation, not only of teachers, but of students who will be pliant subjects, amenable to the dictates of an impersonal state. To this end Swedish legislation has practically outlawed private schools so that now only one half of one per cent of the nations's children attend private schools. Swedes are denied the fundamental right of freedom in education in many different ways, and there is a rigid educational bureaucracy centered in Stockholm which determines teacher certification, curricula, selects authors, and prints the textbooks. Furthermore it is economically very difficult to organize a private school in face of the heavy tax structure because no deductions from taxes are allowed for religious, educational, or charitable organizations. Meanwhile the state schools have become an institution to replace the traditional family structure of mother, father, child. In the new "SIA" school, there are activities from eight in the

(2) Herman Kling, "Directives for 1969 Family Law Proposal." (Stockholm, Sweden).

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morning until eight in the evening, organized by different organizations which are invited into the school to activate and ideologically motivate the child.

In effect, parents are prevented from influencing what takes place at school. Some parents have protested against the new "SIA" schools. One thousand parents, in Stockholm, concerned that students were being compelled to participate in these ideologizing activities, employed a parent-lawyer, Lars Rosengren, to argue that this was in violation of the international conventions, to which Sweden was a signatory, which guaranteed the rights of parents to determine the form of their children's education. "These so-called free activities should not be obligatory ... they eliminate all individual initiatives," said Mr. Rosengren, "I am going on to the Human Rights Commission in Strasbourg with this because this form of schooling is contrary to the Convention on Rights and Freedoms of the Council of Europe." But the government bureaucrat, Birgitta Ulvhammar said: "By the decision of the parliament all children *must* participate in *all* activities, I cannot do anything about it." (3) Parents are told, in fact, that the education of children is strictly a state responsibility, and that parents should have no influence on any aspect of the education of the child. As a result there is no effective PTA in which the parents can express their views. Furthermore, in order to break down that individualism which sometimes crops up, even in a society that has been conditioned by social welfarism for over four decades, individual differences and achievements are to be eliminated by abolishing grades. Thus no one will be able to assert his or her individuality, and all emphasis on individual achievements will be correspondingly reduced. Little homework is assigned, because when children bring their textbooks home the parents are able to see what kind of books are read. Indeed, some textbooks are never taken home: they are retained in the schools and the parents do not have access to them.

Because religion is closely related to values, little religious freedom is permitted in Swedish schools, and to exempt a child from state religious education in the secularized state schools, parents must plead very special religious status, and belong to some very unusual religion. Religion classes are now taught in a totally relativistic way with Moses, Marx

(3) *Expressen.* (Stockholm). 26 May 1979, p. 33.

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and Mohammed being put on an equal level. This is regarded as "objective" religious instruction, being, as it is sometimes called in the USA, secular humanism. Parents in one little Lutheran, St. Martin, congregation in Stockholm objected that they wanted to provide religious training for their own children, and proposed to have them exempted from state religious instruction. They had to go all the way to the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe to plead for the necessary pressures on the Swedish government before they, as parents, were allowed this fundamental right. (4)

Pre-schooling arrangements, which used to be taken care of by private organizations or churches, have now been taken over by the Swedish governmental authorities, who argued that: "In order to generalize the provision of a preschool or a kindergarten we must also see to it that every municipality has one." Claiming that: "It is not our intention to outlaw the privately or denominationally operated kindergartens," they nevertheless prohibited private pre-school facilities from organizing classes at the same time as the municipal pre-schools. This was a transparent tactic, since obviously the only appropriate time for pre-school training was during the morning, when many mothers were away at work – not in the evenings when small children are tired.

In particular, Swedish legislation has placed itself in opposition to parental rights. The child is now the ward of the state, and in fact as one radical proposal by a liberal member of the Swedish parliament openly declared: "Our children are not ours."(5) Swedish leftists claim that children should not be allowed to stay at home with their families, because this perpetuates "middle class values." For a mother to raise her own children merely serves to perpetuate "such outdated ideas as a mother-father-child relationship with the father as the main bread-winner of the family." Thus the new legislation in Sweden has created a legal myth, by which the "rights of the child" are most properly taken care of by municipal and state organizations, which must see to it that parents do not exercise undue authority or influence over their children. In other words, the state has assumed the function which traditionally belongs to the family.

(4) The whole story is told in *St. Martin och Draken* (St. Martin and the Dragon) by Dr. Tom G.A. Hardt. (Stockholm). 1973.

(5) Per Gahrton. *Barn i Sverige* (Child in Sweden). (Stockholm). 1968, p. 130.

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Tax Legislation is one other way in which Swedish families are being dominated and changed. The reason why Sweden has one of the world's lowest marriage rates is because the social legislation which determines who receives what often provides greater benefits to two unmarried individuals living together, than to a married couple. There are punitive measures, both in terms of taxation and so-called benefits, which discourage marriage in favor of illicit or casual co-habitation. Taxation policy is also directed to the destruction of the family. Swedish taxation transfers 50 per cent of the average worker's salary to the state, and also imposes 23 ½ per cent in sales tax on all goods and services, including foodstuffs. In this Swedish womb to tomb, or cradle to grave, state-controlled society, both husband and wife must take employment to live, after payment of taxes, and in some communities as much as 46 per cent of the children are in day-care centers. The state has even started *night*-care centers for those women working in mining or other working shifts which require night work. Illness compensation and various other forms of social insurance are also used to break down the emphasis on the family unit, with unmarried individuals being eligible for benefits not granted to the member of a family unit.

Housing policies and control over property ownership can also be means whereby the state can weaken the structure of the family. Sweden has the highest ratio of rented rather than owned housing of any country in the world (with the exception of Switzerland). This is an intentional governmental policy based on the belief that "middle-class values," such as private enterprise, private property, and family are more strongly engendered, and protected, in families which own their own houses and property. People are discouraged from owning their own homes by punitive taxation as well as by radio propaganda. Swedish families on the average occupying the smallest living space per person of any industrial country in the free world, with the exception of Finland. This is the result of an intentional governmental policy, because where the family has only a small living space there is a tendency for it to remain small. Sweden has one of the lowest birth rates in the world; the total increase of the Swedish population in 1981 was six thousand, and you can't build any future-oriented nation on that. Firstly, there is the propaganda by which people are discouraged from owning their own home, and as a result they are put into a

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relatively small space, resulting in a decrease in the size of the family. Secondly, the lack of space also creates what we call "one generation families" – father, mother, and children, with the grandparents living separately elsewhere. Since there is a housing allowance which gives all pensioners free rent in any facility they choose, it is very often the tendency for elderly parents to be forced to leave a home with grandchildren where they have a function to fulfill, the great function of taking care of grandchildren. By this system, keeping living structures small, and by providing free housing for the elderly in some other place, the family is splintered. The state creates a one-generation family in place of the larger extended family which united the generations and promoted close relationships between young and old, one with another. The children living in such a society are subjected, on radio, on television, and in textbooks, to a propaganda that emphasizes that they are individuals who should question and even oppose their parents' values, and that their protector in this is the state.

Then comes, of course, the biggest piece of legislation to which reference has been made on several occasions – the law governing chastisement of children. It was passed in January, 1979, and proscribed the right of parents to punish or discipline these children in any way. In Sweden parents may not speak to their children in a way that a child might interpret as offensive to its dignity. They may not even punish their children by sending them to their rooms. If they do, they are actually prosecutable, and may be reported to the social authorities, even anonymously, by a neighbor.(6) No country in the free world gives social and municipal agencies the same extensive powers to break up a family unit, without court proceedings, or to take the child away from its parents and home, as does Swedish society. Swedish legislation no longer mentions parents' rights, because it regards the state as having the sole right to govern children.

Nils Bejerot, one of Sweden's foremost sociologists and medical doctors, has pointed out that many of Sweden's social ills derive directly from the collectivistic emphasis of the welfare state: "We must seek for the causes of the destructive behavior of the young in the basic foundations of the welfare

(6) A good discussion of the law is to be found in Ronald F. Docksai, *You Won't get Spanked in Sweden*, published by the Institute of American Relations, n.d., Washington, D.C.

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state. During a long period of time there have accumulated so many and so serious disturbances in the system that we now find ourselves in a deepening crisis of the system, where the welfare state itself, through its mechanisms, produces young analphabets, juvenile delinquents, alcoholics, narcotics addicts, physically and psychologically ill, tranquilized and rejected people, at an accelerating speed."(7)

Effects of Swedish Socialism. Some of the effects of Swedish socialism can be seen when children first enroll in school. Seventy per cent of the seven-year-olds suffer from severe neurotic problems. This is how Anna Wahlgren, both as a mother and as professional, reported conditions in a collective day-care center in the weekly news magazine *Reportage*: "Children are drugged. Infants are given nerve medicines. Healthy, normal, ordinary children are given tranquilizers so that they will sleep. There are four year olds who have developed dependency symptoms. There are child day-care centers where half of the children are given sleeping pills, and others where pre-written, ready-made prescriptions are available without a doctor giving as much as five minutes of his time to either child or parent."(8)

These tendencies continue into the teens, and are aggravated by the ready access of wine and beer and other forms of alcohol and drugs to increasingly younger people. In a recent investigation it was determined that wine and other forms of alcohol were regularly available at parties for thirteen to fourteen year olds; that 91 per cent of the sixteen years olds have drunk some form of alcohol, the average being six and a half liters per child per year. 37 per cent of the thirteen year olds drink at least once monthly, and 27 per cent of the sixteen year olds drink weekly. And in addition almost fifty per cent of the thirteen to fourteen year olds have already had experience with marijuana.

Now why does this happen? Sweden is a society with a rich farming and mining heritage that has provided a relative affluence and a rate of economic growth which has suffered a decline only in the last decade, and which has been free from wars and other national catastrophes for a century and a half. The problem is that each child, as it is being raised, is also being

(7) Nils Bejerot, M.D. *Svenska Dagbladet.* (Stockholm). 1978.
(8) Anna Wahlgren. *Reportage.* (Stockholm), no. 8, 1980.

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deprived of the opportunity of seeing the results of his or her work. The child is never really looked upon as an individual, but is all the time being trained (or indoctrinated) by the school system, by the government-owned radio and television, even by the state church, that his or her function is merely to learn to become an adaptable, pliable and useful part of a collectivized social welfare state. So despite the discovery by the Russian Marxist leaders that the collective up-bringing of the child has negative consequences, the social engineers in Sweden's welfare state continue their dehumanizing and anti-individualistic work to the detriment of both the individual and the family system that is so essential to the well-being and even survival of individual freedom. They have seen that the family is an institution which protects the individual from the state, and they have consequently concluded that the family is a rival of the state, and as such must be diminished, if not eliminated.

Full Employment is a primary goal of Sweden's social democracy, both for its politicians and its social planners. To be able to create the social welfare society they envision, everyone must "loyally" share in the demands of the labor market. To reach the goal of full employment – the most sacred of all Swedish sacred cows – women, wives, and mothers must all be actively integrated into the labor market, not as merely part-time workers, but as "equal" full-time workers. A higher percentage of Swedish women work than in any other OECD country: two thirds of all women between 16 and 65 are in employment. This is how Alva Myrdal, Nobel Peace Prize winner and former Minister of Disarmament, put it: " The doctrine that a woman's place is in the home is traditional thinking enmeshed in an accumulation of vague interests, confused emotions and pure nonsense."(9) The Swedish Committee on Equality and Women's Work demands that: "social measures for alleviating the mother's care of small children ought to be instituted and given economic support in order to satisfy the needs of mothers engaged both in employment *and in home work.*"(10) In other words, even the women at home should be relieved of the

(9) Alva Myrdal. *National and Family: The Swedish experiment in Democratic and Family and Population Policy.* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1968) p. 398.

(10) *Ibid.* p. 414.

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"onerous" task of looking after Jane and her baby brother John.

Some years ago I wrote an article about "the family in the Swedish welfare state." Finding it again, as I was preparing this, I updated the statistics which reveal an interesting picture of Swedish life. In 1959, there were, in Sweden, 1,104 day-care centers or nurseries. Two decades later, in 1979, there were 7,294. And yet Swedish social planners say: "We have failed because we cannot yet provide day-care centers for more than half of Sweden's children." As a result of this social philosophy, the percentage of children receiving welfare or some other form of social subsidy, has increased by four times during the same period, so that the financial cost of government provided subsidies or services to the children in Sweden amounted to three billion dollars in 1972.

As a result of this policy, you see young Swedish children desperately asking to be loved, to be fondled, to be touched, to be kissed. One visitor to Sweden observed: "Swedes seem to like children less than any people I have seen ... they brush them off and generally view them as nuisances ..."(11) and in his study *Suicide and Scandinavia*, Dr. Herbert Hendin points out: "In Sweden the tendency is to encourage a very early separation of the child from the mother ... the woman simply does not like to take care of her children and prefers to go back to work."(12)

This is the result of a policy carried out over a long period of time, promoted by access to state monopolized media and enforced by what amounts to a punitive form of taxation. The former Minister of Finance put it this way: "The women should have the right to stay home – if they want a lower standard of living." In such a collectivized society, the state has assumed functions which in more traditional societies belong to the parents. The school and other collective institutions have become *in locus parentes*, usurping traditional roles of members of the family. The effects on the child are somewhat parallel to those in black American society, where the state has assumed the role of breadwinner, in the form of social welfare allotments, in place of the black American male – a tendency brilliantly exposed by George Gilder in

(11) Arno Karlen. "Sweden" *Holiday*. (New York). November, 1966, p. 37.

(12) Herbert Hendin, M.D. *Suicide in Scandinavia*. (Columbia Press, New York, N.Y., 1964, p. 50.

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Chapter eleven of his book, *Wealth and Poverty.* (13)

There is a sadly tragic quality to life in Sweden today. Youth are listless, goal-less, unable to see that anything they do as individuals has any real consequence: there is no longer any nexus between what they do and what results. I have traveled in many different societies in many parts of the world, yet even in the poverty stricken slums of Haiti, or in the most underdeveloped village in black Africa, I have seen a greater warmth of human relationship than in contemporary Swedish society, shaped as it is by a permeating philosophy of economic determinism. In no other society have I seen such a degree of alienation, isolation, purposelessness, lack of individuality or motivation as among the children and the young of Sweden's welfare state.

Three years ago, a documentary film (14) was shown on public television in the United States. This film was made by an Israeli-American woman in Sweden, who interviewed young Swedish people in many pursuits, asking both girls and boys in a Swedish school their plans and aspirations for the future. All of them answered: "We are not planning or preparing, we have no aspirations for the future here." And then she asked whether they thought that American teenagers would answer in the same manner – and they thought they would not. "But here it doesn't matter what we think or what we plan. It won't make any difference for us in the future anyway."

It was this same resignation, to what appeared to be an indifferent world of adults around them, which was reflected in the almost desperate plea in a letter of a fourteen year old girl, published in a newspaper, but in reality directed to her parents: "They do not understand. They don't seem to want to understand, that when I go to a party it's going to be an orgy of sex and drinking." The Swedish National Committee on Psychological Defense conducted an opinion poll a few years ago, with revealing results. Thirty-two per cent of the young who were quizzed did not believe that anything would be accomplished by voting. And of all, it was those between eighteen and twenty-four who most forcefully articulated their alienation. However, the adult population does express the same feelings. In a poll in 1976, only eleven per cent of the

(13) George Gilder. *Wealth and Poverty.* (Basic Books, N.Y.), 1981. pp. 114-127.
(14) *Sweden: Waiting for Spring.*

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Swedish people had a "very favorable" appraisal of their own nation (contrasted with 75 per cent for Americans.)(15) The willingness to work for the future, to be future- rather than present-oriented, to have hopes which motivate constructive action often appears to belong to the nations whose populations have retained some degree of faith. Some years ago a visitor from Eastern Europe commented about the Swedes: "In the Soviet Union, a belief in God has been replaced with a belief in socialist morality – in Sweden it has been replaced by nothing."

Today the failure of Swedes to believe in themselves or in their nation's future is the product of almost half a century of socialist materialism. Suicide is today the chief cause of death among the eighteen to twenty-four year olds, and the fastest increase in the rate of suicide is among the lower teens. A slower "suicide by other means" is the increased incidence of drug-addiction, and lethal thinner-sniffing, each year affecting increasingly younger people in Sweden. This situation is part and parcel of a society which in the name of feminism, or egalitarianism, or the full employment needed to provide the tax revenues to pay for the cost of administering the welfare state, has undermined the very basis of a healthy society – *the family.*

A great American religious leader once reminded us: "No success in life can compensate for failure in the home."(16) That is the voice of wisdom Sweden might well have listened to – and which we need to heed lest also in this country we repeat the mistakes of the Swedish welfare state. For in the destruction of the family – and the traditional interrelationships within it – a cornerstone of society has been dislodged. Traditionally the family has laid the basis for constructive human relationships, imbuing people with a sense of fulfillment, and destruction of family relationships leaves a void which the Swedish government has been unable to fill.

(15) The Gallup Organization Quoted in *The Book of Numbers.* (A. & W. Publishers, New York) 1978, pp. 414-415.

(16) David Oman McKay

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SEX AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By Elizabeth Monk-Turner

Since 1964, more women than men have gone to the polls to vote for President of the United States. Females in 1964, cast one million and three-quarters more votes than men, a margin that doubled by 1972 (Baxter and Lansing, 1980). While females exhibit an increasing tendency to vote, particularly employed and black females, the American electorate, as a whole, has voted at a lower rate in presidential elections since 1964. Females outnumber males in the U.S. population. In 1964, there were 1.8 million more females than males aged 18 and over; by 1972, this figure increased to 6.5 million. Projections for the year 2000 indicate that there will be 9 million more females than males in the U.S. population over the age of 18. These trends make the attitudes of women voters particularly significant in helping us to forecast future directions in U.S. policy.

Sex Differences in Voting Behavior

The Nineteenth Amendment, passed in 1920, legally enfranchised women. However, existing social norms, one of which held that a woman's place was not in politics, did not encourage women to vote, and in the 1920 election only one third (34.7%) of eligible females voted, while 66% of all men did vote. Women still vote at a slightly lower rate than men. However, due to their numerical majority in the population, females have outnumbered males since 1945, women constitute an "invisible" voting majority, in the sense that they do not see themselves as a voting bloc. The most likely female voter has some college education, works, has a family income in the upper third of the national distribution, is between the ages 31-60, and lives outside the South. Changes are apparent in a number of these areas. Particularly we should examine two areas — education and work.

Females continue to enter the higher educational system in large numbers. Aggregated data show that 50.9% of those enrolled in higher education in 1979 were women (Randour,

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et al., 1982:191). Disaggregated statistics show women are in a majority only in two-year institutions of higher education. Many suggest females will continue to enter the higher educational system in record numbers because the rate of return to their educational investment is high – higher, in fact, than it is for men (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979:117; Randour, et al., 1982; Monk-Turner, 1982). Thus, as women acquire more education, their rate of political participation may well increase. Educational attainment shapes the political behavior of females more so than for males. Today, it is more likely that a college educated female will vote than a college educated male (Baxter and Lansing, 1980).

Female labor force participation is also on the rise. In 1948, less than a third of all females worked outside the home, if one includes all those aged 16 or more, working for pay at least one hour a week, or working at least 15 hours a week on a farm or in a family business. Female labor force participation has steadily increased, and, since May 1978, over half (50.1%) of all females over the age of 16 were in the labor force (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1978). This rate is, however, deceptively low because of the relatively large proportion of the female population which is over the retirement age, as a result of low female mortality rates. Thus, in 1978, 58.5% of women between the ages 20-64 were in the labor force (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979: 8, 37).

In the past, the peak participation periods for women were among women aged 45-64 and those aged 18-19. Older women returned to work after rearing children, to help pay for additional family expenses, like children's college tuition, while younger women worked before entering their child bearing and rearing years. Since 1963, the most dramatic growth in female labor force participation has been among women aged 20-34 (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979:17). Thus, by 1978, the familiar double peak in female labor force participation virtually disappeared. Females are entering the labor force in increasing numbers and, more importantly, they are not dropping out of the labor force during their child bearing and rearing years. This indicates that employment continuity, as well as participation, is increasing among women (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979:70,73) Projecting patterns of change observed in the 1970s into the future, Lloyd and Niemi (1979) suggest that the

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shape of the female age-participation profile might well be transformed into the inverted U shape exhibited by male profiles.

Employed females are more likely than homemakers to vote (Baxter and Lansing, 1980). Anderson (1975) compared changes in political participation for three groups, working females, males, and housewives, between the years 1952-1972. He found a much higher percentage increase in political participation for working females (32%) than for males (7%) or housewives. Therefore, increases in female labor force participation should positively affect the trend toward increased female political participation, with the result that women are likely to continue to hold the balance of voting power.

The Women's Vote – A Bloc Vote?

Women have not been generally thought of as an organized, or potentially organizable, political group. In the past, analysts have concentrated on factors such as religious, regional, educational, occupational, racial, and class differences which cut across sex lines, rather than identifying and studying factors which distinguish women voters from male voters. Males and females do agree on a wide range of political questions, however, clear differences by sex currently emerge on issues related to war and peace, and generally on "aggression" issues.

Male/female differences in political attitudes appear most consistently around humanitarian issues, especially issues of war and peace. These differences have become more apparent since WWII (Baxter and Lansing, 1980). As a group, females are less likely than men to seek military solutions to political and international problems (Freeman, 1979). Females are far more likely than males to view U.S. entry into both World Wars, the Korean War, and the Indo-China War as a mistake. More females than males were opposed to the Cambodian invasion in 1973. More women classify themselves as being doves than do men (64% of females in a 1969 Gallup poll said they were doves).

Females generally favor non-military foreign aid, especially where clear-cut humanitarian goals are identified. After WWII, females, on average, favored continued rationing so that more resources could be made available to war-damaged and less-developed economies. Besides these concerns related to war

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and peace, females are also less supportive than males (by 6-17%) of the death penalty, even for convicted murderers, and of the development of nuclear energy (Baxter and Lansing, 1980); Stockard and Johnson, 1980). Females are more supportive than men of social welfare programs. Indeed, women, particularly young educated women, are generally reported to be "less conservative" than their male peers (Soule and McGrath, 1977;187-190; Frieze, et al., 1978; Baxter and Lansing, 1980).

Many explanations have been advanced to account for differences observed in political attitudes between men and women. In general it has been suggested that females are less prepared than males to support socially sanctioned violence; that females are more concerned than males with "moral behavior" and the "preservation of life"; and that females are instinctually less "aggressive" than males, and less ready to resort to violent behavior to defend themselves against violence.

One might conclude that females are less supportive on aggression issues because they are less concerned about violence than are men. Zellman (1978) argues that this is not a correct perception; rather women are sensitive to violence and feel threatened by it. They are more likely than men to perceive any increase of crime in their own neighborhoods. They are also more likely to be afraid of walking home alone or being at home alone than are men. By the mid-1970s, 68% of women reported such fears, while only 26% of men did (Frieze, et al., 1978: 343).

Much research supports the contention that females are more concerned than males with moral behavior and the preservation of life (Frieze, et al., 1978; Baxter and Lansing, 1980). Baxter and Lansing (1980) argue that because women give birth they are more concerned than men about its preservation. Females are more likely than males to feel that parents who abuse their children should be jailed. Also, females favor laws against drunken driving and are more supportive of the police (but, only when police activity does not involve direct physical reaction or "violence") (Frieze, et al., 1978).

Another hypothesis that has been expounded to help explain male/female differences on "aggression" issues holds that ob-

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served differences in aggressiveness* may be biologically based. Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) research shows that in every known society men exhibit more aggressive behavior than do females. Male nonhuman primates are also more aggressive than their female counterparts (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974: 222-43). Much research shows that males of all ages engage in more physical aggression, real and imagined, than do females. In general, aggressive, dominant qualities are more important in male than in female groups (Tavris and Offir, 1977).

Sex differences in aggression appear early in life. Little boys left to play with a Bobo doll (a large inflatable doll that rights itself after being punched) were shown to be more likely than females to hit the doll repeatedly (Tavris and Offir, 1977). Feshback and Feshback (1973) found that boys struck the doll, on average, 28 times, whereas the girls in the study hit Bobo only 4.5 times during a play period. Such sex differences appear early in children's lives, before culture has "socialized" males to higher levels of aggressive behavior.

In general, there exists some agreement that biology influences the development of aggressive behavior in males. Therefore, it is easier to socialize men to exhibit aggressive behavior patterns. To argue that a tendency toward aggression is influenced by biology, however, does not mean that social roles are determined by them (Stockard and Johnson, 1980: 142).

Sex differences are apparent in analyzing how males and females perceive aggression issues. I argue that this difference can be understood, in part, by looking at biological differences by sex in aggression. Even if one does not accept this argument, the fact remains that on issues of war and peace, capital punishment, nuclear energy, and social services, females and males, on average, disagree. Thus far, attempts to organize women along these lines, or others, to form a voting bloc have not gained much success. Should a women's voting bloc materialize, it could exercise substantial power. Many elections are close. Richard Nixon lost in 1960 by the equivalent of one vote in every precinct. Given that women are in a political majority in the U.S. today, and the increasing tendency by females to vote, the potential political power of an organized women's voting bloc is apparent.

* Please note that aggression, which is hostile in intent, should be distinguished from assertiveness, which is the ability to make ones's interests and desires known to others.

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A Gender Voting Gap?

An unusual degree of polarization between men and women (and blacks and whites) is evident in analyzing approval of the Reagan administration. In 45 years of Gallup polling, never has there been greater disagreement on performance of a U.S. President (Gallup, 1981). Typically, there has only been 2 or 3 percentage points difference by sex in presidential approval ratings. In analyzing differences in approval of the Reagan administration, as much as a 14 percentage point difference exists between men and women – women are not as likely as men to support this Administration (Gallup, 1981). Polls this past summer showed less than 50% approval of the Reagan administration by both men and women with a significant gender gap holding (Norman Transcript, 1982).

The principal explanations advanced to explain the gender voting gap centers on the idea that women believe Ronald Reagan is likely to get the U.S. involved in war. As many as 46% of females surveyed feared Reagan's actions could lead to war, whereas only 37% of males think so (Gallup, 1981). Past research (Fulenwider, 1980) shows that women worry more about the possibility of war than do men. This is important because those who worry about the possibility of war are more likely to perceive differences between political parties in terms of which would be most likely to engage in military conflict. When asked which political party would most likely keep the U.S. out of war, both males and females favored the Democratic Party (by a margin of 13 percentage points over the Republican Party) (Gallup, 1981).

In addition to fears of war involvement, females are less supportive than males of Reagan's defense policies, the Administration's handling of relations with the U.S.S.R., and Reagan's support of production of the neutron bomb (Gallup, 1981). Only 49% of females surveyed support Reagan on defense policies, whereas 65% of males do. Likewise, only 42% of females support Reagan's policies regarding U.S./U.S.S.R. relations, while 55% of all men support such policies. Fewer women yet, 39%, approve Reagan's decision to produce the neutron bomb, yet a majority (54%) of men approve of this decision (Gallup, 1981). Analyzing another issue related to defense, peacetime conscription, one finds males and females

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again very much apart. Males favor such conscription (53% for – 42% against), whereas females do not (43% for – 49% against). Similarly, females favor gun control. Reagan does not support gun control, a sentiment shared by a majority of all men polled (62% against – 34% for) (Gallup, 1981). Women are also less likely than men to support the development of nuclear power plants, something Reagan does, once again, support.

Dissatisfaction with President Reagan among women has spread to include Republican women in general. In the August 5, 1982 Harris Survey, 54% of women polled said they intend to vote Democratic in November, while only 38% favored Republicans (Norman Transcript, 1982). Women hold a voting majority in the U.S. today, and, as a group, they exhibit an increasing tendency to vote. In close elections, a change in one vote in every precinct could change the outcome of an election. Thus, given that women outnumber men in the population and that, by 1980, they were voting at almost the same rate as men, the fact that an absolute majority of women lean toward the Democratic Party could spell disaster for Republicans in future elections.

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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

By Walter G. Thompson

The policy of "affirmative action," aimed at advancing the educational, economic and ultimately social status of minority racial and ethnic groups, and also of females, has played a central role in the engineering of social change in the United States during the past twenty years. Last defined in 1979 as "those actions appropriate to overcome the effects of past or present practises, policies or other barriers to equal opportunity,"(1) affirmative action has recently attracted increasing criticism in that it openly seeks the advancement of less competent or qualified members of the identified "minority" groups against the interests of more competent or qualified individuals belonging to the category of "White males." Since the program remains in force in all educational, commercial and industrial organizations which are recipients of government funds or government contracts (in excess of $50,000 per annum), the history of what has been described as an "anti-quality policy" is well worth examination.

The concept of affirmative action first appeared in Executive Order 10925, issued by President Kennedy in 1961, for the furtherance of "non-discrimination" in employment of Negroes, Spanish-speakers, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts. Implementation by federal commissions in compliance with President Johnson's Executive Order 11246, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, soon evolved to the point where heavy litigation and court ordered penalties and back payments of wages, allegedly due to those who were supposed to have been discriminated against, led to the establishment of ethnic quotas by many major corporations and educationsl institutions. Any history of affirmative action in the U.S. must take into account:

(1) the legislative, executive, and judicial basis for affirmative action, and

(2) the history of federal policy in respect to "equal" employment and higher education.

Legislative Action

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act is commonly regarded as the broad

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legislative basis for affirmative action. The Act provided that:

> It should be an unlawful employment practise for any employers...to limit, segregate, or classify his employee in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities(2)...and authorize the courts to remedy proven instances of discrimination by ordering "such affirmative action as may be appropriate"(3) However the Act specifically stated that: "Nothing contained in this Title shall be interpreted to require any employer....to grant preferential treatment to any individual or any group because of race, color, religion, sex or national status of any such individual or group on account of any imbalance which may exist with respect to the total or percentage of persons of any race... employed by any employer."(4)

It is noteworthy that this last provision [Section 703(j)] has not been honored. Section 703(j) arose out of the Dirksen-Mansfield amendment adopted following a debate centered about preferential treatment. In addition, the 1964 Civil Rights Bill floor leader, Senator Hubert Humphrey confirmed that employment quotas were not intended, when he stated in an Interpretive Memorandum that the Act:

> "does not require an employer to achieve any kind of racial balance in his work force by giving any kind of preferential treatment to any individual or group" adding that such an action would violate Title VII.

Senator Humphrey also affirmed the principle established in section 703(g) that illegal inequality involved an intent to discriminate, rather than "inadvertent or accidential conditions," before a violation of law could be deemed to have occured. Similarly he rejected the enforcement of preferential treatment to provide relief in cases of past discrimination.(5) During the debate in the Senate, Senator Clark responded to a question by stating that: "quotas are themselves discriminatory,"(6) and assured the Senate that the Equal Employment (EEOC) Opportunity Commission would have to prove discrimination "by a preponderance." Senator Humphrey added that the application of ability tests in the employment process was legal unless used for the purpose of discrimination." Opposition attempts to introduce words to specifically prohibit quotas(7) resulted in the insertion of the Dirksen-Mansfield

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amendment as Sect. 703(j) with the intention of preventing "reverse discrimination."

The Equal Employment Act of 1972

Following the 1964 Act, the Department of Labor acted forcefully to impose affirmative action through the United States, with the aid of numerous District Court decisions. The Equal Employment Act extended the reach of the non-discriminatory clauses of Title VII specifically to state and local "governments," "governmental agencies" and "political subdivisions." Most federal agencies were required to "maintain an affirmative action program of equal employment opportunities,"(8) and were authorized to obtain court order injunctions for mandatory affirmative action programs, including, but not limited to, the hiring or reinstatement of "minority" workers, and "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."(9)

Executive Action

Executive Order 11246

Legislation in respect of the affirmative action program has been greatly augmented and interpreted by executive orders:

> "The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without due regard to their race...Such action shall include but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment or recruitment advertising, layoff or termination...rate of pay or other forms of compensation and selection for training, including apprenticeship."(10)

In *Youngston Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (1950) Justice Jackson cited the Supreme Court's decision concerning President Truman's Executive Order to seize control of steel mills for the common good.(11) While lawmaking was the prerogative of Congress the Supreme Court decision stated that Executive Orders were legally enforceable when issued in pursuance of express or implied wishes of Congress or where Congress made no subsequent attempt to show its disapproval, leaving "the imperatives of events" to define power.(12) President Johnson's Executive Order is described in *Contractors Asso-*

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ciation v. Sec. of Labor (1971) as falling within these categories.(13) While the court respected 703(j) as prohibiting "race-conscious quotas," that section was not believed to invalidate the Executive Order on four grounds:

(1) The restriction posed by 703(j) was deemed to be operative only in respect of Title VII.

(2) It was suggested that Executive Order 10925 had been mentioned under Title VII in condonement. Congress therefore contemplated the continuing existence of the executive order program.

(3) Congress was said to have implied its support of affirmative action policies from the definition given by the Department of Labor by placing Executive Order 11246 and Title VII under the auspices of EEOC.(14)

(4) The Fannim Rider against the affirmative action plan, later upheld against the *Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania*, and Senator Erwin's anti-preferential treatment amendments were regarded as invalid.

Issuance of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) in the Department of Labor (1970)

Affirmative action was here defined as:

"a set of specified and result-orientated procedure..." which includes "an analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and, further goals and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed."(15)

Judicial Action

The interpretation given to affirmative action legislation by the judiciary strongly reinforced the power of the Executive to impose affirmative action policies on the nation. Circuit courts began with a number of contradictory interpretations of Title VII, but the Supreme Court ruling in the *Briggs* case finally set the legal trend:

a. Initial Cases:

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., The court determined that Title VII (703(j) mandated neither 'in favor of' nor 'against' minorities.

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., The court ordered employment of and award of seniority to a Black previously

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denied employment for reasons regarded as "discriminatory" under 703(g). The minority opinion of the court questioned Title VII's intention of providing relief at the expense of other workers.

In 1971 *Virginia Electric Power Company* was ordered to pay $250,000 back wages to a Black worker allegedly denied promotion, while the court mandated that a specific quota of new employees in union jobs should be non-White.

b. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* (1971.(16)

The Supreme Court apparently rejected subjective intent to discriminate as a prerequisite to relief authorized by Title VII. According to the interpretation of the Act by the court, general intelligence tests, described by Humphrey as "legal unless for the purpose of discrimination," had to be validated for job-relatedness wherever their use appeared to discriminate against a non-White applicant because they resulted in the recruitment of disproportionate numbers from the different ethnic groups. Cases after *Griggs* gradually built a somewhat nebulous pattern of determination within the bounds of Title VII (703(g).

U.S. v. Wood Lathers Local 46 (1973; 2nd Circuit). The court ordered 100 minority applicants to be included in the union, after the total figure of 170 minority members dropped to 72 following union withdrawal of permits to non-union personnel. *Louisiana v. U.S.* (US145 1965) was cited.

Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638 (1973). The court ordered minimum quota requirements for non-White workers in union and joint employee-union apprenticeships programs under Title VII refied.

U.S. v. Masonry Contracting Assoc. of Memphis (1974; 6th Circuit). The court upheld quotas because of past discrimination in the industry, basing their decision of *U.S. v. Wood Lathers Local 46.*

Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie (1972; 7th Circuit). The court ordered the Association to implement "equal employment opportunity" by a quota hiring system (preceded by minority recruitment training) for highway construction according to the percentage of potential minority travellers on the highway. *Swann* and *U.S. v. Montgomery Board of Education* was cited by which schools were ordered to accept quotas of Black teachers into White schools. (Cath. Univ. Law Rev 26.513. N.B. *Brunswich School Board v. Cali-*

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fornia (1978) and *Romeo Community Schools v. HEW* (1977) have since rejected the argument that Title IX may be regarded as authority for school employment policy regulations).

Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commission (1973; 2nd Circuit). The court ordered interim quotas by section I of the CRA 1964, thus bypassing the prohibition of quotas contained in 703(j).

In *Bridgeport Guardinas* (2nd Circuit), quotas were implemented citing. *Carter v. Gallagher* (1971; 8th Circuit), which was itself based on 703(g) "hiring of employees" as a form of affirmative action, somehow bypassing the 703(j) quota prohibitions.

Evolution of Present Federal Policy in Respect to Employment and Higher Education

The EEOC (now the second largest federal regulatory program in the U.S. employing 3,468 people) has assumed the implementations of Executive Order 11246 and Titles VI and VII under the Equal Employment Act of 1972, with regard to private employees, labor unions and employment agencies. As head of OFCCP during the Ford Administration, Lawrence Lauber launched a mass of litigation calling for massive back payment settlements to minority individuals who had allegedly suffered from discrimination in the past. In 1971 Lorillard Corporation was ordered to pay $800,000 to a non-White employee who was alleged to have suffered from discrimination. American Telephone & Telegraph was ordered to discharge back pay totalling $15 million to minority employees, in addition to introducing affirmative action goals and timetables.(18) Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith were required to pay $1.9 million compensation (1976). As a result of such enforcement, companies sponsored voluntary affirmative action programs "as a cost of doing business."(19) These programs also resulted in heavy administrative costs and the University of Michigan paid out $350,000 on the cost of statistics alone, while Sherman(20) refers to the cost of the University of California at Berkeley's affirmative action program as being $400,000 for the year of 1974-5.

In general, the procedures for implementing "equal employment" by federal agencies fall into two categories:

(1) Enforcement of compliance by private employers

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has evolved through the findings of four Supreme Court decisions: *Greggs, Washington v. Davis, Bakke* and *Weber.*

(2) Industries holding federal contracts of at least $50,000 must follow OFCCP guidelines.

Private Employers

a. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* (1971).(21) The court entitled agencies to intervene when discrimination could be defined in terms of results rather than intentions. Should validation tests in respect of entrance qualifications produce negative results so far as minority recruitment was concerned, affirmative action were said to be warranted. Qualification requirements for jobs which resulted in "adverse impact" (a variance of more than 20% in the percentage of minorities employed in relation to the ethnic ratio of the diverse populations living in the area from which applicants came), were required to be replaced by alternative selection procedures which would meet the ethnic ratio quotes.

b. *Washington v. Davis* (1976)(22) represented a narrower interpretation than *Griggs.* The court was of the opinion that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 1964 was subordinate to the 14th Amendment which would require the prosecution to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. By interpreting 703(g) contrary to congressional will and shifting the emphasis to the 14th Amendment, the court proceeded to rule that the constitution justified the imposition of quotas to enforce compliance with affirmative action goals – a conclusion which could not have been reached on Title VII alone, e.g. because of the 703(j) prohibitions of quotas.

c. Private Reverse Discrimination Suits & Bakke. Reverse discrimination began to appear in the courts before *Washington v. Davis,* citing Title VII 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as a backlash to the imposition of quota systems.

Defunis v. Odegaard (1974).(23) The court dismissed as moot the plaintiff's claim that he had been unconstitutionally denied admission to law school because the school gave special preference to minority applicants. (A court decision ordered him to be accepted and he had almost completed the course by the time his complaint was heard).

Regents of Univ. of Calif. (1975). The plantiff was accepted to the University.

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Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke (1978).(24) Bakke claimed that his rights under Title VI were threatened because the University minority quota of 16 out of 100 places had resulted in two minority students substantially less qualified than he being allocated places which he was denied. Four members of the court supported his case while the fifth, Justice Powell, qualified his agreement stating that the university's quota was 1) too rigid, 2) based on no past discrimination or agency order, and 3) inapplicable to the field of education.

As a result of the *Bakke* decision the "Guildelines on Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of CRA1964, published by EEOC, emphasized the legality of imposing numerical employment goals and timetables rather than 'absolute quotas," subject to qualified applicant availability (at 4425) while employers who have developed a written affirmative action plan shall be allowed to make use of Sect. 713(b) (1) in defense against reverse discrimination.

d. The decision of District Justice Gesell in awarding damages for reverse discrimination by the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. in 1976 was one of a number of successful although limited reverse discrimination cases in industry. However, in *United Steelworkers v. Weber* (1979),(25) the Supreme Court held that Title VII is not violated by the voluntary introduction by private industry of affirmative action programs "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." In his majority opinion Justice Brennan stated that it would be ironic if Title VII prohibited voluntary private race-conscious efforts, that being "the intent of the title."

Federal Contracted Industry

a. Executive Order 11246 states that all businesses accepting contracts with the Federal Government to a value of $50,000 or more must implement affirmative action plans.

Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec. of Labor (1972).(26) Quotas were upheld in this first judicial test of the governments new mandate. The comment of the Comptroller General that quotas violate CRA1964 was stated by President Nixon to be irrelevant, on the grounds that Congress gave the Attorney General, not the Comptroller General, the authority to interpret CRA1964. On September 22, 1969

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the Attorney General forbad employers to make race a factor in the hiring of employees.

U.S. v. New Orleans Public Service Inc. (1977).(27) The court confirmed the validity of Executive Order 11246, since Congress 'implied' approval through silence, and agreed to implementation of the Executive Order under EEOC, according to the 1972 Equal Employment Act. The administration was also said to have the power to determine terms of purchase (*Perkins v. Luckens Stell Co.* (1940)) so long as the contract was voluntary.

b. Minority Business Enterprises/Small Business Administration *Fullikove v. Klutznick* (1980).(28) The Supreme Court upheld the government's right to require that 10% of contracts go to minority owned companies on the grounds of "general" past discrimination. The Small Business Administration program authorized SBA to subcontract from other governmental agencies to minority companies.

Conclusion

Congress has to date failed to challenge Executive Order 11246 which interprets Title VII 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in a fashion contrary to the expressed intent of Congress' original legislation. The courts have also upheld affirmative action in cases where discrimination was assumed to have existed in the past by way of broad 'interpretations' all of which seek to justify racial goals and timetables. Many saw the Bakke case as the first corrective decision towards an acknowledgement by the courts of Congressional intent as revealed by section 703(j). Yet now that the Supreme Court's Weber decision has passed over Congress' original intent and interpreted Title VII as being supportive of quotas, the Bakke case has in effect been filed away as a decision which was unique to the supposedly special circumstances of the case, and future courts are free to continue to support affirmative action in a 'flexible' manner. The indications are that "affirmative action" may well continue in force in the United States through the forseeable future, due to the fact that the so-called minorities, which include women, constitute an actual political majority. Furthermore these groups are represented politically by highly organized lobbying organizations, many of which have succeeded in obtaining their fundings from government sources and must

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consequently maintain an aggressive political program if they are to ensure their own continued funding and survival. No individual business corporation or state-subsidized educational institution is able to challenge the policy, and the resultant cost of advancing less competent/less qualified candidates over more qualified candidates has to be either covered by government subsidies or absorbed into market costs — with resultant upward pressures on U.S. budget deficits and downward pressures on U.S. industrial and commercial competitiveness.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; 44FR 422.
(2) C.R.A. 1964 Sect. 703(a).
(3) C.R.A. 1964 Sect. 703(g).
(4) C.R.A. 1964 Sect. 703(j).
(5) Con. Rec. 8921 (1964).
(6) Con. Rec. 7218 (1964).
(7) 110 Con. Rec. 9981 (1964).
(8) 42 USC 2000e-16.
(9) 42 USC 2000e-5(g).
(10) New York Univ. Law Rev. 53.376.
(11) 345 U.S. 587-8.
(12) 345 U.S. 635-8.
(13) 442 F2d at 170-1.
(14) 118 Con. Rec. 1391-4 (1972).
(15) 41 CFR Pat. 60-2.10. Feb5 1920: Cath. Univ. L.R. 26.513.
(16) 401 U.S. 424.
(17) Business Roundtable.
(18) 13 FCC 2 766-771 (1968).
(19) Business Week 1975: 94.98.
(20) 1975:296.
(21) 401 U.S. 424.
(22) 426 U.S. 229.
(23) 416 U.S. 312.
(24) 46 USLW 4896.
(25) 443 U.S. 193.
(26) 404 U.S. 894.
(27) 553 F2d 459 (5th Circuit).
(28) 448 U.S.

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CONTRADICTIONS OF UNIONISM

By Morgan Reynolds

> You need men and I have all the men and they are here in the palm of my hand; and now I ask, 'What am I bid?'
>
> *John L. Lewis*

> The AFL-CIO. . .support anti-trust action to encourage competitive pricing throughout the economy. These laws have fallen victim to court delays and legal shenanigans. This situation must be stopped if the government is to prevent monopolistic practices, including administered pricing of goods, cornering of markets, and dividing markets by cartels.
>
> *AFL-CIO, The National Economy, 1977*

The main problem in any political discussion of unionism is to separate the rhetoric from the reality. A loss of nerve in the intellectual, academic, and political communities has long exempted unionism from the scrutiny normally directed at other interest groups like corporations and bureaucracies. Organized labor has effectively portrayed itself as underdogs who labor against great odds to improve the lot of all working people. Those who might have the temerity to puzzle over the accuracy of this picture are vilified by unionists as "anti-union," "right-wing," "reactionary," or exponents of "Republican trickledown economics." Dispassionate analysis is difficult under these circumstances and in the social sciences, where a reputation for compassion is valuable and personal courage not especially abundant, most scholars are loathe to be tainted by the charge of anti-unionism.

Disinterested observers tend to excuse the verbal and written rhetoric of union spokesmen on the grounds that unions are political organizations whose leaders often say things that, to put it mildly, lack candor. Or it is claimed that we must expect to find some contrary statements in union speeches, especially since their statements are sometimes intended to appeal to emotion. Another excuse is that we should assume that all parties to policy disputes are equally well-intentioned and, therefore, it is impolite to quarrel with many union assertions. Let me be impolite: Unionists may not be intellectual sophisticates but their views are worthy of serious discussion. Unions are large organizations that exert significant influence in the

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economy and in the political arena. The words of powerful men can expose their bedrock beliefs. The symbols chosen by men of affairs are not neutral artifacts; they shape ideas and behavior. Whether sincerely expressed or not, consistent themes run throughout union speech and it behooves us to critically examine these concepts to discover if rhetoric corresponds to reality.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a few slogans of unionism. I find union rhetoric seriously incompatible with the evidence about how unions actually behave. Among the shibboleths are the claims that unionists support free enterprise and oppose socialism, that unions are a central source of economic progress for the masses, and that corruption and racketeering are minor features of unionism. The actual policies of unionists in the political arena, as well as their behavior in the marketplace, undermine the legitimacy of these claims.

Union Thought

Union discourse is composed of more than declarations of sympathy for the disadvantaged and unemployed. A chief candidate is unionists' oft-announced support for a free enterprise system. This claim has been widely accepted, but there is no basis in fact to support the hypothesis. Unionists say they support free enterprise, a mechanism based on the principles of voluntary exchange, mutual cooperation, liberty of contract, and open competition, yet U.S. unionism is too often based on the practice of economic disruption, industrial warfare, compulsory bargaining, monopoly over the supply of labor, and (seemingly) the politics of hate. There are numerous instances of inflammatory statements which no businessman would dare contemplate. For example, Lane Kirkland, now president of the AFL-CIO, said in 1978:

> There is a term for the kind of campaign that American industry has launched to kill the hopes of the most oppressed and deserving workers in this country. It is class warfare. . .launched by the most privileged and powerful in our society. (1)

Or consider remarks by William Winpisinger, president of the Machinists' union:

> In my lifetime, no group has ever gotten justice in this country without lawlessness. So if we want to see change,

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then we may have to stop having to have such a high regard for law and order.(2)

Unionists and their apologists essentially have a Marxist interpretation of the world when they pronounce on public policy, although they never admit it in so many words. The rejoinder to this charge is that American trade unionists oppose communism overseas and are a bulwark against communism at home. Yet constant use of words like "class," "struggle," "corporate giants," "greed of the rich," "the enemy," "American multinational corporations," "they keep the profits," "docile work force," and "human needs" in their rhetoric says quite a bit about the ideology of unionism, despite occasional well-publicized statements about union moderation and "working together" with industry and government.

Much of the sloganeering in union circles has a superficial plausibility, especially among people who accept the false analogy between war and commerce. The big have an obvious advantage over the small when it comes to fighting a war, but large and small can prosper in commerce if they please their trading counterparts on the other side of the market. Unionists continue talking about corporate giants and underdog workers because this appeals to a natural sympathy for smallness (family farms and small business are familiar political examples) despite the fact that there is virtually no rational substance to these emotional appeals in the case of unions. Many unions are huge organizations. Perhaps the most obvious deficiency of union reasoning, if we can truly call it reasoning, is that unionists never urge the logical conclusion of their bombast: overthrow of accused oppressors like bankers, corporate executives, rich investors, and big business. Without private enterprise, markets, managers, and investors, of course, unions would expire as independent organizations.

Big Business Day was held April 17, 1980, and it reveals something about the ideology and direction of unionism, if we can judge by unionists' choice of friends. Supporters were an amalgam of trade unionists, consumerists, environmentalists, and clergy. The advisory board included UAW president Douglas Fraser, UFW president Cesar Chavez, and colleagues like Ralph Nader, John Kenneth Galbraith, James Farmer, Julian Bond, Barry Commoner, Michael Harrington, and Robert LeKachman. The board included no representatives from the

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business world, but organizers said the movement was not anti-business. It was supposed to begin a decade-long effort to "educate the people," "correct the abuses of big business," "fight crime in the suites," make nominations to the "Corporate Hall of Shame," and "see business better understood. . . how it sets prices, persuades consumers, influences legislators, and otherwise plans our lives."(3)

Union leaders generally express opposition to socialism in the abstract, much to the bewilderment of European socialists and American radicals. Unionists know that a socialist government cannot tolerate union power, and recent events in Poland offer vivid evidence for this assertion. Yet the predominant effect of union action and rhetoric is to undermine capitalism. For instance, some people cannot imagine an unreasonable union demand. Unionism promotes the idea that only selfish businessmen stand between "labor" and abundant wealth, which discredits businessmen, promotes an infantile view of the production process, and completely misrepresents the problem of scarcity. The entrepreneurial effort, capital accumulation, and production arranged by businessmen and investors are the wellsprings of prosperity, not obstacles to the prosperity of working people. Use of the term "employer" by unions is even misleading because both businessmen and workers are employed by the people who really pay the bills, the customers. Businessmen are only intermediaries between suppliers of inputs and the true employers.

Taken to extremes, the anti-business propaganda trumpeted by unionists inflames emotions and induces terrorist elements to bomb corporate property, kidnap, and even kill corporate executives. Today, businessmen in many countries, including Europe, live in fear for their lives, and it could happen here too. The result would be a deterioration of morale of managers, greater willingness to tax and regulate business, greater reluctance to save and invest in corporate businesses, and steady impoverishment of the nation. The reduction in economic growth would likely be interpreted as justification for more government intervention.

Union pressure backs expansion of government spending programs and virtually every intervention, old or new. Nationalization of the oil industry, nationalization of the health care industry, subsidies to unionized industries, and on and on. It is

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impossible to find *specific* union proposals which promote free markets or a more liberal market order in international or domestic trade. Even on the issue of wage-price controls, where you might expect unionists to support freedom from government control, Lane Kirkland, leader of the AFL-CIO, called for "controls on the cost of everything and the income of everybody."(4) Union support for free enterprise is simply another instance of the tribute that vice pays to virtue; there is no substance to the claim. Union policies lead to more concentration of power over economic decisions in the hands of people in the central government. The more government controls, the more those who control government control. If union officials have given this cause-and-effect connection any thought, they must believe that they will emerge in control of government.

Perhaps a more accurate assessment is that unionists have no conception of what an ordered economy would look like. When caught in a contradiction among their cliches, unionists are likely to obfuscate or plead that they are practical men without ultimate answers. For instance, I attended an address by Harry Hubbard, head of the Texas AFL-CIO, before a group of secondary school teachers. Hubbard advocated wage-price-profit-interest-rate controls during his talk, and a teacher asked him how he could control the prices of imported goods too. Hubbard's reply was, "Well. . .I never said my plan was perfect." Hubbard could think of nothing else to say, and a few moments of deafening silence passed.

The honest truth is that union thought is unprincipled, in the best (non-pejorative) sense of the word. They have no principles, only advocacy of *ad hoc,* coercive interventions against those people who are perceived as evil. Like most collectivism, on analytical grounds, unionist thought supplies little more than a language for the resentful and an inspiration for protest. Harsh words, perhaps, but harsh words have a place in the description of reality. I take no pleasure in the description. I wish the rhetoric of unionism were otherwise.

The deceptive language of unionism is not confined to unionists. It has affected public policy. The courts frequently adopt it and its anti-market premises. Consider, for example, *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin* (301 U.S. 1[1937]), the main Wagner Act case which ushered in the modern era of labor regulations. The Court's reasoning in favor of the Wagner Act

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relied upon the erroneous economic arguments in the Act's "Declaration of Policy" plus the main legal precedent urged by the government lawyers, namely, *Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood* (281 U.S. 548 [1930]), which made the Railway Labor Act constitutional. The Court accepted the entire government argument, which was based on union cliches. The Court asserted that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer, that an employee was unable to leave his job to resist arbitrary treatment, and that a union was essential to give laborers an opportunity to deal in an equality with their employers. The majority of the Court, in more blunt language, asserted that business owners are powerful knaves and employees are helpless widows and orphans.

The announced intent of the Wagner Act (NLRA) was to bring industrial peace, facilitate the stream of internal commerce, maintain purchasing power, and equalize bargaining power. High-minded goals, but the special privileges granted to unions cannot and did not achieve them. An accurate translation of the phrase "industrial peace" would be appeasement of the trade unionists, who effectively advertised themselves in the 1930s as preferable to the communists who would otherwise lead workers if the Wagner bill were not adopted. Was it prudent to accommodate unionists on these grounds? Certainly it depends upon perceptions about whether American workers really were incipient revolutionaries, ready to follow communists, or whether it was an empty threat. Moreover, that oft-asked question of politics arises, will they stay bought? Departure from the rule of law in favor of a polity of pressure groups has brought its own problems.

Facilitate commerce? The problem is that labor unions, by their very name, are essentially monopolies or labor cartels designed to interfere with commerce via the "weapons of labor," until demands are met. If I were a dues-paying union member, I wouldn't have it any other way. Maintain purchasing power? The problem is that unions push up the relative wage of members and the prices of union-produced goods, reduce real national output, and tilt national policies toward erosion of the purchasing power of the dollar.

Equalize bargaining power? Bargaining power is a term which has never been precisely defined. It is an example of word magic. Typical of the persuasive words in politics, it goes

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undefined and unmeasured. It presents an interesting scientific problem: we cannot know if unions have "equalized bargaining power" if it goes unmeasured. No one has measured power on one side, power on the other side, and then checked to see if the indices moved closer together after unionism. The *ad hoc* economic notions of the courts often are hard to falsify because their economic assertions lack direct empirical content. Presumably, in the case of bargaining power, we would have to find quantitative symptoms of the alleged reduction in unequal power, maybe a rise in labor's share of value added in unionized industries. Serious economic studies, however, can find no union effect with any consistency.(5)

Union leaders constantly stress the monopsony model of the labor market (single buyer), claiming that giant corporations impose wages which must be accepted by helpless unorganized workers unless their individual strengths are pooled to achieve equitable wage rates and working conditions. Of course, the definition of "equitable" depends on whether you are paying the price or receiving it, but the union description of a buyer's monopoly on labor services has succeeded so well that it is the pillar of labor policy in every Western country. It has produced a public policy based on the idea that the labor problem is how to arrange an "equal fight" between management and labor, how to establish so-called equal bargaining power. The courts, to put it as gently as possible, are not sophisticated in economic reasoning and are imbued with the union model of labor markets.

Plant Closings

Although unions claim to be the main source of higher real wages, they support legislation that imposes severe costs on firms that cease operation for any reason. A bill introduced by Rep. William Ford (D-Michigan) requires that firms with as little as $250,000 in annual sales must give notice of intended plant closings up to two years in advance, pay all employees 52 weeks severance pay, and pay local government 85 percent of one year's taxes; the bill also would force taxpayers to provide a variety of governmental aid to affected workers, communities, and so on.(6) If unions are the source of economic progress, why do unionists support restrictions on capital mobility? Political support for these additional taxes and restrictions on

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capital implicitly acknowledges that economic improvements essentially are based on productive plant and equipment, technical advance, and managerial efficiency, not on strikes and other union activities.

The free market directs capital and labor to places and uses where they can earn their highest returns. If allowed to operate, resources tend to be reallocated continually to their most productive uses. Efficiency and growth are the results. Unions have impeded this process by restricting the mobility of labor, but they have been unsuccessful in directly restricting capital investment in the past. If Ford's bill should pass and the central government takes a greater hand in the allocation of capital, the purchasing power of worker's wages necessarily will fall. Apparently, similar bills have passed in a few state legislatures.

Proponents of penalizing capital mobility concentrate on the employment losses due to plant shutdowns. TV and newspapers find newly idled resources easy to understand, but this myopia is on a par with an assessment of banking which only looks at withdrawals. Naturally, such an analysis would conclude that banking was doomed. The crucial point is that restrictions on closing plants is equivalent to restrictions on *plant openings* because if a firm is forced to continue operating an outmoded plant, it cannot invest in a new facility. Labor and capital remain tied up in inefficient activities because they cannot freely seek their highest payoff. The political appeal of restrictions is that the new victims are invisible and do not know that their economic opportunities have diminished due to union-backed legislation.

Communities with eroding industrial bases have an alternative to the use of federal coercion if they wish to retain and expand their industries: compete with successful communities. Reduce oppressive taxation, regulation, support for high wage costs and trade unions, and efficiently provide public services in return for any tax dollars collected. Unionists, however, are not interested in this answer because they are not interested in competition. Two proponents of legislation to restrict capital mobility, Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, state it with reasonable clarity:

> Trade unionists are especially concerned with how firms use capital mobility to keep labor [sic] off guard, to play off workers in one region against those in another, and

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> how the threat of capital relocation is used to weaken labor's [sic] ability to resist corporate attacks on the social wage itself.(7)

Some unionists even declare that a plant shutdown is "criminal" and should be treated as such.

Advocates of restrictions really want protection from the competition of other communities, competition from their production facilities, and competition from their workers. Unionists want protection from pricing themselves out of the market. Economist Richard McKenzie says consumers and taxpayers should be particularly concerned about restrictions on plant closings because:

> As the bill is now written, it hands over to unions the power to price labor out of the market – to turn a profitable concern into a losing proposition – and then gives them access to the coffers of the federal government for a 'bailout' or 'buyout.'(8)

McKenzie also says that in a truly free society people should have the right to decide what they should do, how they should live, and where they should invest their labor and financial capital. Private rights to move, to invest, to buy, and to sell seem to play little role in discussions of federal policy in the modern era. A conspicuous illustration of the reach of federal intervention is *Wickard v. Filburn* (217 U.S. 111) decided unanimously by the Supreme Court in 1942. Mr. Filburn was an Ohio farmer who refused to pay a fine levied on him by USDA Secretary Wickard for growing more wheat than allowed under quotas established by authority of the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act. Mr. Filburn used his small amount of wheat over the quota exclusively for feeding his livestock, making flour, and seeding on his own farm. The Supreme Court upheld the federal fine, ruling that crops grown on a farm for use on the same farm were part of interstate commerce, despite the fact that the goods were never bought or sold in any market. This ruling raises the more general question of whether "private" resources exist in the U.S. economy for their nominal owners to allocate as they might deem profitable.

Pension Funds

Employee pension funds are another instance where unions silently admit the power of capital as the instrument of eco-

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nomic advance. A large literature on "pension-fund socialism" has arisen in the last decade. Exact figures differ, but most say that American workers own at least a third of corporate assets in the nation. At the end of 1979, private pension funds had assets of more than $350 billion, state and local funds had another $150 billion. The most controversial book in the area, *The North Will Rise Again* by Rifkin and Barber, drew considerable attention when it appeared in 1978.(9) The argument concentrated on the pension funds of union members and employees of state and local governments in northern states, arguing that a coalition among unions and northern state governments should jointly manage "their" capital funds to restrain the ongoing reallocation of investment toward the South and West. Unions could seize control of pension plans and invest the funds in pro-union, northern enterprises, the argument went. Delegates to the 1979 AFL-CIO convention passed a series of resolutions which urged unions to avoid investments in companies that engage in anti-union activity and to direct funds into "socially worthwhile" channels, aiding the unemployed, underprivileged, and the poor. In 1980 the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department issued a report which reviewed the pension-fund investment practices of 10 large companies and found that funds "were often heavily invested in non-union firms and firms with high overseas employment. . . in ways that take away jobs of employees in this country."(10)

Pension funds, of course, are the savings of workers. Each worker wishes to maximize the return of his/her pension investments in order to enjoy a comfortable retirement. Spending on "the poor" may be an endeavor employees want to pursue on an individual basis, but they can do more good if they receive maximum returns on their savings. More importantly, employees are trying to avoid being poor after their own retirement by setting aside earnings in well-managed pension programs today. Control of pensions by union leaders and politicians guided by "social goals" does not augur well for the well-being of workers. Examples of shady investments by the Central States Teamsters' pension fund (over $2 billion "strong" and reputedly a "bank for the mob") and the purchase of $3 billion of otherwise unsaleable New York City bonds by the New York City and New York State pension funds in 1975 are vivid reminders.

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Currently, pension assets are turned over to professional managers who are legally required to invest and maximize the return for employees. Private pension plans are regulated by four main provisions in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which are intended to promote prudent management and high returns:

1) Professional management of corporate pensions with the obligation to seek the highest return consistent with safety,

2) Minimal or no investment of funds in any company for which plan participants work,

3) No investment in a company in excess of 5 percent of that company's total capital, and

4) No investment of more than 10 percent of the pension fund's total assets in one company.

These federal regulations do not cover state and local government employees, and their funds are a potentially fertile field for public employee union officials. Other union members are covered by ERISA but are poorly protected because the U.S. Labor Department generally takes a hands-off policy toward union-dominated pension funds, estimated to exceed $90 billion.

In most craft unions, funds are administered by a board of trustees with equal representation by union and management while industrial union funds are generally administered by management alone. The latter fact is the subject of bitter complaint by industrial union leaders and an extended topic for collective bargaining pressure. Some small unions operate their own plans. A Senate subcommittee found in most instances that a trustee from the union dominated the proceedings at joint boards, including selection of an insurance carrier or fund manager, and trustees from company management usually just went along. The subcommittee report said, "This raised the question of whether or not the fact that the management trustees would have to face the labor trustees across the bargaining table at some future date may have affected their actions as trustees."(11) The subcommittee recommended that the Taft-Hartley Act be amended to require neutral trustees on joint union-management boards.

The future depends on how intensively union leaders pursue these opportunities, the degree to which government enforces

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contractual law, and the evolution of new legislation. The quality of federal enforcement probably will prove inferior to state enforcement of state laws on pension management, although the lines of enforcement currently are very confused. It is not even settled as to who legally owns or controls these funds. Centralized bureaucrats, friendly with their union clients and insulated from competition, cannot outperform a decentralized system, despite the reputation for impartial efficiency enjoyed by federal bureaucrats. The full extent of union corruption is unknown because indictments and convictions are only a sample, but about 450 union officials and employees have been convicted of serious union-related crimes in the past seven years. Twenty-two civil suits were filed by the government during this period to recover stolen union pension funds, with known financial losses totaling over $170 million. "If the present rate of imprudent investments or outright looting continues," says Robert C. Steward who heads the Justice Department's organized crime units in New York and New Jersey, "this nation will face a benefit-fund default of catastrophic proportions."(12)

Union Corruption

Prevailing academic opinion is that union corruption and racketeering are unpleasant though minor features of unionism, similar to imperfections in human behavior elsewhere. Professor Clark Kerr, for example says:

> Corruption exists, and it is bad; but right and wrong are quite evident and hardly open to debate. Few unions are involved, and other institutions in society have known and do know it also. . .Violence also is to be condemned. It has decreased greatly as a union tactic. . .These are issues, and they will be for a long time; they deserve attention, but they are peripheral to the main contemporary controversy.(13)

Harvard professors Bok and Dunlop write that

> . . .legal safeguards now go far to curb dishonesty and encourage democratic behavior. Probably only a tiny fraction of all union officials in America would stoop to serious abuse.(14)

The General Counsel of the McClellan committee in the late 1950s, Robert F. Kennedy, found abuse wherever he looked:

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". . .in the course of my studies it became plain to me that mistakes had indeed been made. For instance, in the early days of the [Kohler-UAW] strike, the union had formed mass pickets at the plant and with human blockades had kept workers out. And it had erred in other ways: the record shows some eight hundred instances of violence, threats, telephone calls, 75 percent of which had been directed against non-strikers. . .beatings. . .ten or twelve organizers to come in and lend a hand. . .two or three of these (organizers) were big hulking men, and the testimony revealed they were under no direct instructions and were permitted by the UAW to do exactly what they wished. . .We have mentioned a few who betrayed their trust – Hoffa (Teamsters), Cross (Bakers), Joey Fay (Operating Engineers), Maloney (Operating Engineers), Johnson (Carpenters),. . .We uncovered corruption in the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union, in the Mail Deliverers Union in New York. Max and Louis Block, who ran the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen's Union in the New York area were prime examples of labor officials who misuse their position for personal enrichment and power. . .Lloyd Klenert, secretary-treasurer of the relatively small United Textile Workers of America, and Anthony Valente, the union's president, used the UTWA's comparatively small treasury to buy luxurious homes for themselves. . .(15)

Despite this sorry record, Kennedy further said:

The labor movement in America is a huge, living, human machine. . .It is subject to human error. But with a few exceptions, the men who run our great labor unions in this country are honest, dedicated men.(16)

Kennedy, academic writers, and most others cannot see any pattern because they firmly believe that unions are public servants who countervail "management power," rather than self-interested, organized minorities with special privileges to coerce. Each use of violence is a mistake, every shakedown an exception. The prevailing view of union activity is so strong that the premises of this defective theory of unionsim are never reexamined.

The incentives of coercive monopoly unionism and the enduring pursuit of self-interest explain the extraordinary

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corruption in the labor representation industry. Special legal immunities are an open invitation to criminals and racketeers to enter. Successful unions fundamentally depend on force and, naturally, specialists in the application of force generally rise to the top. Racketeers set up labor organizations or take over what once were legitimate unions. Ultimately, it is impossible to tell them apart because both types depend on violence and the threat of violence. Unionists counter that they contribute to community service agencies, blood banks, and scholarship funds. True, but irrelevant. Most people love their mothers and donate to charities, but these are basically consumption activities, not production of income, which is the focus of economic analysis. The plain truth is that our labor laws have arranged incentives so that honest, non-coercive union officials find it difficult to survive in competition with the muscle types.

Racketeering is an interesting word to define. Murray Gurfein offered this version:

> Racketeering, a term loosely applied to a variety of criminal schemes, has not yet received exact legal definition. It usually designates however, the activity for profit (in connection with sale of goods and services) of an organized group which relies upon physical violence or an illegal use of group pressure to accomplish its end. (17)

Gurfein also called it organized extortion and levying of periodic tribute. To illustrate a racket he said:

> The simplest type is that in which a monopoly is set up by the racketeers with no other aid than protection by politicians. Illustration is found in rackets in some perishable foodstuffs, where the technique is to coerce retailers through suggestion or ready example of violence to cease buying from the wholesalers and to buy from a new and unnecessary middleman – the racketeer himself. (18)

What is striking about this description is how close it comes to describing otherwise legitimate trade unionism. Certainly the economic technique is the same, differing only in degree of lawfulness. Legal campaign contributions apparently can buy better protection and better politicians than illegal bribes can.

If picketing and sabotage can force enterprises to recognize union officials as bargaining representatives and also force the payment of higher wages, it can serve other lucrative purposes as well. According to a study by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,

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Tobacco, and Firearms, incidents of union violence by bombing alone caused $3.8 million in property damage between 1977 and 1979.(19) Many union leaders, although not all, apparently view non-union workers as renegades and union members as vassals or, at best, foot soldiers in the union army. This is consistent with the philosophy of unionism which claims that individual workers are helpless, lack personal dignity, pride, and capacity for independent thought.

There are two essential conditions required for the existence of sustained corruption: 1) a bureaucratically (or artificially) created scarcity, and 2) separation between the negative effects of corruption and the bureaucrat's own wealth. In other words, individuals with the power to distribute artificially scarce goods can extract bribes from eager supplicants, whether it is a building supervisor accepting "key money" from new tenants to whom he has "granted" a rent-controlled apartment, or a union official who has favored a firm with a worker, or a union member with an employment opportunity. Craft unions fulfill the conditions for corruption best because they have local markets, low public visibility, and frequently a life-and-death grip over employment. Most racketeering, therefore, occurs in the building trades, trucking, longshoring, cleaning and dyeing, restaurants, garment trades, furriers, theaters, produce, and live poultry. Perishability, tight time schedules, and small businesses make them easier marks. Relatively little racketeering occurs in the large industrial unions because they are in highly visible national firms, goods are nonperishable, time schedules more flexible, and unions lack a tight grip over employment through closed shops and referral hiring halls. CIO union leaders have been more noted for their "progressive" social philosophy than racketeering. As C. Wright Mills wrote in 1948:

> It is said there are racketeers in the AFL and that the CIO has communists. Both statements are true.(20)

There are some 10,000 building trades business agents in the country, and an article about Frank Sonsini, business agent for Local 32 of the Bricklayers Union in Newton, Massachusetts, tells a lot about their power:

> Members approach him only when summoned, and when he talks they listen carefully. . .Almost singlehandedly and without a by-your-leave to international headquarters, Frank Sonsini can negotiate a contract or call a strike. When there are jobs to be had, he decides which members

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> can get them. No one joins Local 32 without his approval. He runs the pension and health-care plans. 'Frank operates like a king,' says an admiring colleague. (21)

Some academics spend a great deal of effort studying the internal operations of labor unions, and lament the lack of union "democracy" and the low caliber of leadership. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin) was passed in 1959 in order to correct the situation after the McClellan hearings exposed widespread graft and corruption among union officials. The Act defined a "Bill of Rights" for members (strongly opposed by unionists), required unions to adopt written constitutions and by-laws, regulated the use of trusteeship, set elections standards, and permitted members to sue officials for misuse of union funds. If unions were nothing more than private associations, this law would have constituted an extraordinary intervention by the central government into the private affairs of association members and their elected leaders. But unions, of course, exercise coercive power over many job opportunities and the resulting abuses of power by union leaders must then be regulated.

The net effect of these regulations has been virtually nil, except for a blizzard of paperwork filed at the Labor Department. An investigation on the scale of the McClellan hearings would uncover as much or more corruption in unions today, and the Organized Crime Strike Force program in the Justice Department is slowly establishing it. An experienced Department prosecutor said,

> Organized crime in labor is probably the most serious problem in the criminal field. It overrides everything else. It is frightening to the economy. I can name four national unions now in the hands of hoodlums. (22)

Four unions, namely the Teamsters (2 million members), Laborers (475,000 members), Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders (430,000 members) and International Longshoremens' Association (60,000 members), have accounted for about one-third of the 450 union convictions over the last seven years — the remainder being spread over unions like the UAW.

If the situation is so bad, why don't union members vote the criminal element out? First, many union locals do not have serious corruption. There are about 71,000 locals in the country

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and approximately 500,000 elected unionists, but many have no significant power over a union-created scarcity and, therefore, few temptations to abuse power. They are stewards, grievance committeemen, and the like, who debate where the water cooler should go rather than what wages will be, who will get work, who will get workers, when workers should strike — nor do they handle union funds. The Justice Department estimates that less than one half of one percent of union locals in the U.S. are plagued with systematic corruption, many of this half percent being located in Chicago, Miami, and northern New Jersey.

The second reason is that apathy is widespread. There is little incentive for one person to buck the system. Most people want to work and then be left along with their families. Opposition means bearing heavy personal costs without much personal profit, unless that person plans to run for union office. Furthermore, if leaders are displaced, the same corrupting incentives remain for their successors. Third, very tangible restraints discourage troublemakers, especially in the craft unions. Economic pressure is foremost, with brass knuckles in reserve. A dissident can expect no union job opportunities and that's usually sufficient to discourage everyone under unionized systems of rigid seniority, wage structures, and promotion opportunities. Formal union complaint proceedings are controlled by the union leadership who can impose fines and work suspensions. One union reportedly disciplined over 4,000 members and fined them $300,000 in a single year.(23)

Employees can petition to have the union decertified as a bargaining agent or campaign for new leadership or protest election results, but the drawbacks are formidable. For example, union officials are allowed to expel members who file a decertification petition, without fear of nullifying the election results. If a member suspects election fraud, the member must exhaust the remedies under the union constitution/by-laws before a complaint can be filed with the Secretary of Labor. If the Secretary finds probable cause, the Secretary brings a suit in federal court. In addition to tangible obstacles, union ideology denounces "dual unionism," "raiding," factionalism," or any other form of individualism or competition against entrenched leadership.

Most union constitutions provide that a member may be

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disciplined for "conduct unbecoming a union member," or "conduct detrimental to the best interests of the union," or "slandering an officer," or "undermining the constitution." They usually specify member rights too, but it is reminiscent of the Soviet constitution, initially widely praised in the West as the most perfect document in history, despite the fact that it was based on the one-party (monopoly) principle, thereby negating human liberties. The trappings of democratic rule are a very light camouflage for the feudal conditions under which people in a Laborers' or Operating Engineers' Union work. Union power holders have the same view of "deviationists" as Soviet rulers do. Valery Chalidze, editor of *Kronika Press,* a periodical of Soviet dissidents, says that Soviet propaganda maintains "the individual has no need for freedom of speech, it stresses instead expression of the collective will."(24)

Multiple salaries and expense accounts totaling six figures are common among the statesmen of the labor movement. These incomes entice people with modest schooling and modest alternative employment options to considerable effort to keep their jobs. Thirteen of the top fifty-four national union officials in the country received over $100,000 in 1979 according to financial reports filed with the Department of Labor. The late Teamsters' president Frank Fitzsimmons topped the list with $296,000, including $124,000 in legal expenses to defend himself against a challenge from dissidents who charged him with union improprieties.(25) Less visible are the unknown hundreds of officials in craft unions that drew three and four salaries from various union organizations and have three or four severance pay and retirement accounts.(26)

Since 1967 the chief compliance officer within the U.S. Department of Labor responsible for monitoring the handling of union funds has come from the ranks of unions: Thomas R. Donahue from the Service Employees; W. J. Usery, Jr., from the Machinists; Paul J. Frasser, Jr., from the Steelworkers; Bernard E. DeLury of the Lathers' and Teamsters' unions, and Francis X. Burkhardt of the Painters. Arthur L. Fox, an attorney for PROD, a reform-minded organization of Teamsters, says that putting "a union guy in there to decide whether to prosecute unions is an outrage – like letting the wolf into the chicken coop."(27) There are numerous instances of USDOL foot-dragging. For example, attorneys from the Justice Department

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in 1975 asked the Labor Department to take over as court-appointed monitor of the assets of a laborers' union fund after its president was convicted of embezzling union and pension funds. The Secretary of Labor refused on two occasions, saying that there wasn't any statutory precedent, and it would take too much manpower. The embezzler got $2 million more.(28) No wonder the Department of Labor is sometimes referred to as the Department of Organized Labor.

Union officials are elected, yes, votes are cast, yes, and counted by whomever has control of the election machinery. Most national officers are elected at a national convention by delegates beholden to the national officers. Contested elections are rare. A key problem is that it is almost impossible to mount a significant challenge to an incumbent president in a national union without active members of the union's executive board. Participation in turn depends on whether insurgents are confident that if their challenge fails, they still will be reelected to the board because of their secure power base in the union. In effect, this requires board election by geographic district rather than at-large election. Most unions have at-large elections for board members, the exceptions being some of the old CIO industrial unions like the USW and UAW. Sara Gamm studied all unions ever affiliated with the AFL-CIO which had more than 25,000 members and found that only 26 of the 81 unions had executive boards elected by geographic district, and only 13 had district boundaries fixed by constitution rather than by executive board or president.(29)

Even with direct membership balloting and contested elections, there are many examples of suspicious results. A classic example was the defeat of President David J. McDonald of the United Steelworkers in 1965, an election which he actually may have won, but challenger I. W. Able had more control over the poorly-supervised electoral machinery. There have only been five election defeats of an incumbent union president in 51 major U.S. unions during the years 1949-66, including McDonald's defeat.(30) In this period there were over 300 elections and all five defeats occurred in industrial unions formed after 1930. In the old-line AFL unions, displacement of national union officers is truly a rare event: Dan Tobin was president of the Teamsters for 45 years; William Mahon led the Transit Union of 53 years, John L. Lewis the UMW for 41 years, Joseph Moreschi the Laborers' for 42 years, J. A. Frank-

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lin the Boilermakers' for 36 years, and so on. As a George Bernard Shaw character proclaimed in the play *The Apple Cart*: "No king is as safe in office as a Trade Union official."

In high union office you are almost more likely to lose your life than an election. The unsolved disappearance of Jimmy Hoffa in the summer of 1975; and the murder of UMW presidential candidate Joseph (Jock) Yablonski, his wife, and daughter in December, 1969, killers hired by UMW president Tony Boyle, are well-known incidents of union murder, but there are more. The government has tried many of the key suspects in the Hoffa case in an unsuccessful attempt to get a cooperative witness, and one who appeared ready to talk, Salvatore "Sally Bugs" Briguglio, was gunned down in 1978. Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano murdered a union boss, Anthony "Three Fingers Brown" Castellito, to take over his 12,000 member Teamsters' local. Tony Pro was convicted in 1978 of the murder plus extortion and then appointed his daughter to run Local 560, thus retaining control while serving his term. Four officials in the Laborer's union alone have been killed by hitmen, the tenth largest union in the nation, a union which did not hold a convention for thirty years, and whose leadership is Italian and membership mostly black. (31)

Union leaders have little to fear from the law, despite increasing enforcement effort. LaVern J. Duffy, former McClellan committee investigator and current general counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Investigation said, "Only a small percent of these crimes are being detected." (32) Punishment of union-related crimes is seldom severe, for example, most embezzlers never go to jail. Of the 450 union officials convicted over the last seven years, only 168 were formally barred from holding union office as required by the Landrum-Griffin Act. The conditions under which union corruption flourishes have been largely created by government legislation.

What about the businessmen who cooperate with union corruption? Aren't they as guilty as the unionists who take bribes? By and large, businessmen are as much victims of union muscle as union members are. Businessmen do not seek out additional expenses such as illegal payments to unionists, they only pay because unionists are in a position to extort money by coercive threats – cutting off labor services or else use of direct violence. Extortion often is a more accurate term

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than business bribes to union officials, although there are cases where union officials and employers jointly extort funds from employees or other enterprises. Confronted with union monopoly and violence, businessmen are naturally tempted to use the "grease" so forcefully demanded by unionists. It is similar to doing business overseas, where government officials frequently demand pay-offs as a routine matter before they will allow American businessmen to do business. Is it bribery or extortion?

Conclusion

Much of the actual behavior of unions and union officials is inconsistent with their expressed sentiments and also is inconsistent with some widely held beliefs in the general public. Unionists do not in fact support free enterprise or decentralized decision-making generally; they also hinder economic growth by a variety of means, including restrictions on capital mobility; and corruption and racketeering is an integral, unavoidable feature of unionism with economic and political "clout."

Perhaps the most enduring underlying rationale for unionism in the academic and intellectual community is the argument that unions provide "workers" (those people down there) with political representation. We are left to vaguely believe that employees would go unrepresented in the political or economic process without unions or that some kind of unspecified doom would follow any reduction in the political power of big unions. This is no more thoughful than the 1960s argument that the federal government should spent $XXX billions to prevent burning and rioting in our central cities. The Marxist view is that the "upper classes" occasionally are forced to appease the masses with welfare doles ("bread and circuses") in order to avoid revolution and seizure of ill-gotten capitalist booty. This approach leaves little room for reasoned discussion of principles to guide individual behavior or action by the state, nor does it suggest a promising positive model or explanation of human behavior. The ultimate argument for the special immunities of unionists is to allow us "to keep the lid on," to suppress the strong susceptibility of working people to revolution and communism, to extend the life of capitalism for a few more years. Unions of working people must have special legal privileges or else "labor" will not tolerate the remnants of capitalism

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and free markets.

The most improbable aspect of the argument is the belief that "hard hats" are inherently revolutionary. No evidence is offered, nor do advocates carefully demonstrate why use of organized force (laws and regulations) on behalf of organized unionists forestalls incipient radicalism. Perhaps a relevant question is whether commentators on the left ever worked for a living with their hands or met any blue-collar workers. In the high spirits of the 1960s, some SDS radicals went off campus into blue-collar workplaces in order to spread the good word. The campaign disappeared within a few weeks, presumably in the face of unpromising returns.

FOOTNOTES

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(5) A. Rees, *The Economics of Trade Unions,* 2nd edition revised (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 89; M. Bronfenbrenner, *Income Distribution Theory* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), pp. 83-87; N. Simler, *The Impact of Unionism on Wage-Income Ratios in the Manufacturing Sector of the Economy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961); P. F. Drucker, "The Danger of Excessive Labor Income," *Wall Street Journal,* (January 6, 1981), p. 28.

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(15) Robert F. Kennedy, *The Enemy Within* (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 211-12 and 277-78.

(16) Ibid, p. 211.

(17) Murray I. Gurfein, "Racketeering," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 45.

(18) Ibid.

(19) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, "Explosive Incidents," *1978 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1979).

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(22) "How Washington Winks at Corruption in Unions," *U.S. News and World Report* (January 23, 1978), p. 64.

(23) Walter Gellhorn, "Address on Receiving the Hillman Award," in N. Chamberlain (ed.), *Sourcebook on Labor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 210-15.

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(25) *Business Week* (May 12, 1980), pp. 86-89.

(26) "The Six-Figure Set – City's Labor Leader Elite," *Chicago Tribune,* (October 23, 1977). Also consider this excerpt from S. Brill, *The Teamsters* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 338:

"He [Jackie] may be good," explained PROD's research director, Robert Windem, referring to Presser, a Teamster officer. "But is he $200,000 good, with no real education and with even people he negotiates against not getting paid that much? Also, he's the king of severance and pension plans from the Teamsters covering him. This is just a rip-off that avoids the embezzlement statutes."

(27) *U.S. News*, op. cit., footnote 22.

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TELEVISION DEBATES AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

By Robert E. Gilbert

Almost as soon as the medium of television made its appearance on the political scene some thirty years ago, it became inevitable that that medium would serve as an arena of debate between candidates for public office. As early as the Eisenhower-Stevenson campaign of 1952, there were suggestions that the two major party contenders debate each other on television,(1) but various legal and political considerations prevented those suggestions from being activated. In point of fact, the first Presidential election in history which saw television debates between the major contenders actually take place was the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon contest. In the twenty intervening years, television debates in the United States between the major party contenders took place only on two occasions – the Ford-Carter confrontation of 1976 and the Carter-Reagan battle of 1980.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the role played by television debates in the outcome of the 1976 and 1980 American Presidential elections, using the 1960 election as a backdrop. Also, a comparison between the American debate experience and that of France in the 1981 Giscard d'Estaing-Mitterand election will be made.

The Kennedy-Nixon Experience of 1960

The Presidential election most commonly regarded as having been affected decisively by television debates was the Kennedy-Nixon contest of 1960. In that year, the candidate who was less well known than his opponent at the time the campaign began and whose candidacy was marred by misgivings over his youthful age and Catholic religion, managed to defeat an opponent who was the heir apparent to an extremely popular outgoing President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. In his four nationally televised confrontations with Richard Nixon, John Kennedy was able to deflate the charges that he was immature and inexperienced by projecting an image of dynamism and competence before an audience estimated at 80 per cent of the nation's adult population.

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In terms of impact, the most important debate was the first one, watched by a larger audience than had ever before witnessed an historical political event. By common agreement, John F. Kennedy "won" the first debate and it was that victory which contributed so greatly to his election as President. An analysis of all relevant information indicates that the major factor in Kennedy's victory was the *visual* images presented by the two candidates rather than the campaign arguments made by either of them.

Shortly before the first debate, Richard Nixon had been hospitalized because of a severe knee infection. He had lost weight during his convalescence, a problem compounded by the rigorous campaign schedule he had followed upon his release from the hospital. Additionally, on the day of the debate, Nixon was actually ill and suffering from a fever while Senator Kennedy was well-rested, tanned and in perfect form.(2)

Moreover, the effects of Nixon's ill health were heightened by the fact that the studio wall providing the backdrop to the candidates turned out to be gray, despite several paintings and re-paintings, whereas both candidates had been told the backdrop would be dark blue or black. Expecting this dark backdrop, Nixon wore a light gray suit while his Democratic opponent dressed in dark blue. On the TV screen, Kennedy's blue suit provided just the proper contrast with the gray background while Nixon's gray suit, set against the gray background, gave him a faded, ghost-like appearance.

Appearing side by side on television, Kennedy projected the image of a dynamic, intelligent and articulate leader while Nixon appeared to be in ill-health, nervous and unsure of himself. Especially devastating to Nixon were the reaction shots which caught him while Kennedy was speaking and which transmitted his pale and perspiring countenance into millions of homes across the nation. The practical result of the comparative appearance of the two men was that Kennedy was judged to have won the first debate by a decisive margin.

It should be noted that an important factor in Kennedy's debate victory was that he had *greatly exceeded expectations* while Nixon, previously described as a great debator, failed to meet what many had expected of him. One team of researchers found that Kennedy's "unexpectedly able performance dissolved many doubts about his maturity and experience

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even among Nixon supporters. By contrast there was a dramatic deterioration of Nixon's personal image among Democrats and Undecideds."(3) Ironically, it would have been enough for Kennedy simply to hold his own with Nixon in this first television debate, but he did much more than simply hold his own. Contrary to public expectations, Kennedy seemingly out-debated the "great debater." As one commentator remarked, Kennedy gained ground by proving that he was "able to stand up to the man who stood up to Khrushchev."(4)

In the three remaining television debates, Richard Nixon made a much stronger showing. He "looked" better on television, having overcome the physical problems which had so adversely affected him during the first debate and he offered much stronger argumentation. During their first meeting, Nixon had tried to obliterate the old "character assassin image" that had become associated with him over the years by minimizing the points at which he disagreed with Kennedy and by emphasizing their agreement on long range goals. This strategy, however, was undermined by his physical appearance on the TV screen. Since he "looked" ill and nervous in physical appearance, his refusal to engage in sharp exchanges with Kennedy was translated by many in the audience as weakness and surrender. In subsequent debates, however, Nixon did not suffer from either of these problems. In fact, most observers gave him a clear-cut victory in the third debate.

Nevertheless, Nixon was never able fully to recover from the effects of the first televised debate in which the appearance gap between the candidates had been so great. Once Kennedy had established his knowledgability and political maturity, the Democratic Party began to coalesce behind his candidacy, enabling him to eke out one of the closest victories in American history. A Roper poll found that in direct response to the television debates, Kennedy gained approximately 1.5 million votes.(5) This estimate acquires added significance when one remembers that Kennedy's popular vote margin was an extraordinarily narrow 113,000 and that he carried seven states (with 77 electoral votes) by a margin of less than 2 per cent. President Kennedy seems to have been well justified when he remarked that "it was TV more than anything else that turned the tide."(6)

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The Ford-Carter Contest of 1976

After a hiatus of sixteen years, television debates between American presidential candidates reappeared during the 1976 campaign. In that contest, Republican Gerald R. Ford, who had become President after Richard Nixon's resignaton from office in August, 1974, faced Democrat Jimmy Carter, former Governor of Georgia. As a supplement to their regular television campaigns, Ford and Carter agreed to debate each other three times on national television. This would be the first time in history when an incumbent President engaged his challenger in a television debate. Another innovation that emerged from the debate negotiations of 1976 was that the Vice Presidential contenders, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas and Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota, also would meet in a nationally televised encounter. In order to circumvent the equal time rule,(7) the series of debates was sponsored by the League of Women Voters and was covered by the television networks as genuine news events.

The first debate between the presidential candidates was preceded by intense negotiations. The Republicans wanted the first debate to center on foreign policy where Governor Carter was expected to be weak and the President strong and to be held in early September, almost immediately after the Republican convention. Carter's aides insisted that domestic policy, supposedly Ford's weak suit, be the subject of the first debate and that that debate be held in late September. They were delighted when the Republicans acceded to both demands. The Carter camp also wanted the candidates to remain seated throughout their ninety minute encounter so that Ford's height advantage could be neutralized, insisted that the Presidential Seal not appear on the Ford podium, and asked that the reporters who would make up the panel of interviewers refer to each candidate by the title of "Mister" so that Ford's presidential incumbency would not work to Carter's disadvantage. The final arrangement called for the two candidates to stand at podiums unadorned with Seals of any kind and positioned eight feet apart and allowed reporters to address the candidates using any title they wished. Also, while Carter had wanted a light blue background for the stage set, he finally agreed on the dark blue color desired by the Republicans.

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It was said that President Ford believed that the darker color acted to de-emphasize his receding hairline. Lastly, Carter's camp agreed to the Ford request that holes be drilled in his podium so that his water glass and pitcher could not be toppled accidentally in the heat of the debate.(8)

The candidates approached their first debate in strikingly different ways. The Republicans transformed the theater room at the White House into an imitation of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Theater where the first meeting would occur. Ford rehearsed tirelessly there before a videotape machine, answering question after question thrown at him by aides and wearing suits of different colors to determine which proved most becoming to him. Also, he watched tapes of Carter's appearances on such television shows as "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" so that he would become familiar with his opponent's style.(9)

Governor Carter's approach to the debate was more relaxed and informal. Apparently quite self-confident, Carter watched films of the first Kennedy-Nixon debate but would not allow himself to be quizzed on likely questions as Ford was doing and as Kennedy had done in 1960. In fact, Carter's approach to the first television debate was rather similar to what Nixon's had been sixteen years before — even to the point of remaining secluded for several hours before leaving for the television studio.

The first debate, which drew an audience of 85,000,000, saw an aggressive and articulate Gerald Ford outpoint and outmaneuver a nervous and somewhat diffident Jimmy Carter. The challenger later claimed that being in the presence of the President of the United States had proven somewhat unsettling to him.(10) This was evident particularly in the earliest portions of the debate during which Carter appeared uncomfortable, his voice sounded rather thin and his delivery projected a sing-songish quality. Also, during the earlier portions of the debate, Ford was able to shift attention away from his own record as President by attacking Carter for his "ambiguous" stands on issues and for his preformance as Governor of Georgia. As an example, in his rebuttal to Carter's very first answer, Ford remarked "I don't believe that Mr. Carter has been any more specific in this case than he has been on many other issues."(11)

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As the debate progressed, the Democratic challenger began to reach his stride and became more forceful and self-assured, but just as he was implementing his offensive against the President, a peculiar technical difficulty arose which caused all sound to be lost for twenty-seven minutes. By the time the debate resumed at 11:45 p.m., many viewers had turned off their sets or had switched to another channel. Mechanical difficulties and human impatience had operated to cut short Carter's rebound.

According to Gallup data, Ford enjoyed a clear-cut victory in his first debate with Carter, winning by a margin of 38-25 per cent. Also, according to Gallup, Ford appeared more thoughtful and informed than Carter, answered questions more clearly, seemed less artificial and rehearsed, and appeared surer of himself and more forthright. In all, Gallup found that as a result of the first debate, 37 per cent of respondents claimed they were more likely to vote for Ford and 27 per cent less likely whereas 32 per cent said they were more likely to vote for Carter and a surprising 32 per cent more likely to vote against him.(12)

In their first television encounter, Ford clearly had *exceeded expectations* of himself while Carter had fallen short of his own image. Ford's projection of "presidentiality" enabled him to win the first debate and his victory was reflected not only in the Gallup findings cited above but also in the findings of other national polling organizations as well. Roper found Ford the winner by a margin of 39-30 per cent and the Harris poll put Ford on top by a similar 40-31 per cent margin.

The second debate between Ford and Carter took place on October 7 at San Francisco's Palace of Fine Arts before a television audience of 83,000,000. This encounter focused on foreign policy where Ford's presidential expertise and Carter's personal inexperience created expectations quite different from those which preceded their first meeting. This debate was to prove to be the most important one of the series and ultimately may well have brought Gerald Ford down to defeat.

Throughout the second debate, Jimmy Carter was on the attack. Dissatisfied with his diffident appearance during their first meeting, Carter lashed out at the President in strong terms, suggesting at one point that "As far as foreign policy goes, Mr. Kissinger has been the President of this country."(13)

As the debate progressed, Max Frankel, an associate editor

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of the *New York Times*, asked a fateful question which referred to the "Helsinki Agreement." In a rather rambling response, Ford touched on several subjects and then made a devastating comment: "... there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford Administration." When Frankel tried to get Ford to clarify his position, Ford only made things worse. He added:

> I don't believe that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, I visited Poland, Yugoslavia and Roumania to make certain that the people of the United States are dedicated to their independence, their autonomy and their freedom.(14)

Carter's response was pointed and politically astute. He remarked, "I would like to see Mr. Ford convince the Polish-Americans and Czech-Americans and the Hungarian-Americans in this country that those countries don't live under the domination and the supervision of the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain."

Ford had, by that one remark, made a serious blunder, calling into question his knowledge of foreign affairs. Pat Caddell, poll taker for Carter, said that Ford's remark made this debate "probably the most decisive presidential debate in history."(15) The President's statement was pounced on by the nation's print, television and radio journalists and under their continuous scrutiny the dimensions of the error grew ever larger. A Roper poll taken immediately after the debate indicated that Carter had won it by a margin of 40-30 per cent(16). After days of media attention to the Ford statement on Eastern Europe, however, the public increasingly became convinced that the President had been crushed in his second television encounter with Carter. A subsequent Roper poll found that the public then believed that Carter had been victorious in the second debate by the lopsided margin of 61-16 per cent.

Almost certainly of greater importance was the reaction of Eastern European ethnic voters to Ford's blunder. In Ohio, a state with a large East European population, the Democratic leader in Cleveland called on the President to apologize for his statement and added:

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> I am today urging that Republican ethnic leaders such as Mayor Ralph Perk and County Auditor George Voinovich join with me in repudiating the irresponsible statement by the President and calling upon him to retract it at once.(17)

Similarly, the President of the American Hungarian Federation in Cleveland wrote:

> The Hungarians lost their faith in the President. Correction of the words is not enough. If the ethnic community will not obtain assurances about a new American foreign policy – the first step to which is the dismissal of Mr. Kissinger and staff – Mr. Ford hardly could expect that even the Republican Hungarians would vote for the Ford ticket.(18)

These sentiments were echoed by the Co-Chairman of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters in that same city who stated: "We are very disappointed by President Ford's remarks concerning the status of the captive nations. The governments in Eastern Europe are puppets of the Soviet Union. The Polish people, as well as the Hungarians, never elected their current governments."(19)

Polish leaders were similarly distressed by Ford's comment. The President of the Polish-American Congress labelled the President's statement "ridiculous" and added that "Ford had better study a little more about Eastern Europe. Everyone knows that the governments in those countries are communist controlled." He added, "I think many of our people will go back to the Democratic side now."(20)

The Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee entered the fray by saying that he was "shocked to hear President Ford state and even try to defend this preposterous statement. In my judgement and that of millions of Americans, that statement was incredible."(21)

Carter, of course, tried to take full advantage of the episode. Travelling across the country, he mentioned Ford's remark over and over again, sensing that it might become the pivotal issue in the campaign. In New Mexico, he went so far as to suggest that Ford had been brainwashed in Poland and at a dinner of Polish American leaders in Chicago, he remarked, "It's time we had a President who understands the facts about Eastern Europe and who will speak up for freedom around the world."(22)

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Although Ford had been trailing Carter badly at the beginning of the campaign, he had succeeded in greatly narrowing the gap. As a result of the second debate, however, his momentum came to a halt. Joseph Crangle, Democratic leader in Buffalo, New York, a city with a large Polish-American population, perhaps best summarized the impact of Ford's comment on the campaign: "We were losing the ethnics. There was no negative on Ford, and there were reservations on Carter. Now there's a big negative on Ford and they're getting to know Carter better." Buffalo Mayor Stanley Makowsky remarked, "Many were undecided. Sometimes it takes one thing that pushes them over the brink. This looks like it."(23)

Several days after the second debate, President Ford finally admitted that he had made a mistake. But the damage that had been done to his "presidentiality" could not be corrected. According to Gallup findings, Carter seemed, to a plurality of respondents, to be better prepared and informed, surer of himself and more honest and open about foreign policy.(24) The challenger had greatly exceeded expectations in the foreign policy realm while the President had blundered badly in an area where he should have been strong.

It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate this campaign episode as having had decisive importance in the final outcome of the election. However, it is worth noting that Jimmy Carter carried the ethnically rich state of Ohio by the very narrow popular vote margin of 50.1-49.9 per cent. This was only the second time since 1952 that Ohio went Democratic in a Presidential election. Cuyahoga county, where the city of Cleveland is located, went for Carter by 95,000 votes. Four years earlier, Richard Nixon, a Republican, had carried that same county by 12,000 votes.

Similarly, Carter carried Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the home of many ethnic voters where Ford's gaffe on Eastern Europe had also proven to be something of a bombshell,(25) by 58,000 votes. This enabled him to capture the electoral votes of Wisconsin by a margin of 50.9-49.1 per cent in the popular vote. Without his victories in Ohio and Wisconsin, Jimmy Carter would not have won the Presidency.

A major innovation of the 1976 campaign was the televised 75 minute debate held between the Vice Presidential candidates in Houston, Texas. This event proved to be an acrimonious meeting of political opposites – Dole, a clear-cut conservative

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and Mondale, an emphatic liberal. Each man was also set apart from the other by his own debate style. Dole was casual, almost offhand throughout their televised meeting and engaged in humor which eventually turned to sarcasm as the debate progressed. Mondale, seemingly the more nervous of the two, but projecting an earnest and serious image, stressed his Party's stand on economic and social questions. One verbal comment of some critical importance that evening was Senator Dole's observation that the wars fought in the twentieth century wer "all Democrat wars." He even went so far as to say, "I figured up the other day if we added up the killed and wounded in Democrat wars in this century, it would be about 1.6 million Americans, enough to fill the city of Detroit." Mondale quickly responded, "I think that Senator Dole has richly earned his reputation as a hatchet man tonight. Does he really mean that there was a partisan difference over our involvement in the fight against Nazi Germany?"(26)

As Whitcover wrote: "There was a nervous, erratic quality about Dole, a carelessness. He spun off snide remarks almost as if he were unaware of the huge television audience or, perhaps more accurately, as if he were intentionally disdainful of it."(27) The public apparently agreed. The Roper Organization found that 53 percent of respondents believed that Mondale had won the debate while only 33 per cent believed Dole to be the winner. To capitalize on Mondale's strong performance, the Carter camp quickly prepared a TV commercial which reminded viewers that four out of the last six Vice Presidents had become President and which asked, "Who would you like to see a heartbeat away from the Presidency?"

The final television debate in 1976, this one the third involving Ford and Carter, was held at the College of William and Mary in Virginia on October 22. The two characteristics which best describe this television encounter were the caution exhibited by each candidate as they sought to avoid any error or blunder in the campaign's final moments and the toughness of the questions asked by the panel of news people. Ford was particularly pressed by the questioners and was forced to defend his record and his image throughout much of the debate. Possibly the nature of the questioning which put Ford so clearly on the defensive produced the result as determined by public opinion polls. Both Gallup and Roper found Carter the winner

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of the final debate, the former by a margin of 32-27 per cent, the latter by a 33-25 per cent margin. Carter's performance in the final TV debate against Ford firmed up his own support and gave him additional momentum at the very time when undecided voters were beginning to make their choice.(28) These undecided voters broke heavily for Carter. Among those who decided for whom to vote during the final week of the campaign, 53 per cent supported Carter; among those who decided on election day itself, Carter swept 61 per cent of their ballots.(29)

According to Gallup data, almost 6 out of 10 voters rated the debates as having been helpful in enabling them to decide for whom to vote.(30) Interestingly, this was a slightly larger percentage than those who felt that Ford's pardon of former President Nixon had helped them make a candidate choice.(31)

Overall, the 1976 series of debates plausibly served to elect to office the Democratic ticket.(32) Even though the campaign saw dramatic gains made by Gerald Ford, those gains were compromised in an important way by Ford's inane remark about Eastern Europe.(33) Gallup found that 37 per cent of its national sample felt that that remark had affected in some way their intention to vote for Ford and that of those, 29 per cent had become less likely to cast a Ford ballot.(34)

More specifically, Eastern European Americans tended to take strong exception to the President's comment. The partial desertion of these voters may have precipitated his narrow loss in pivotal states such as Ohio and Wisconsin, a loss which produced his ultimate election defeat. Had Ford not made this blunder during his second television debate with Carter, he may well have carried these two states and, with them, won the White House for four more years. It is no wonder, then, that a Polish-American leader described Ford's remark as "a gift from heaven for Carter."(35)

The Carter-Reagan Campaign of 1980

In 1980, there were few political gifts from heaven for Jimmy Carter. The President faced as his Republican opponent one of the most media-wise candidates ever to run for public office. Former California Governor, former television and movie star Ronald Reagan, locked horns with Carter at a time of great public frustration over the months-long incarceration of Ameri-

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can hostages in Iran and a seemingly out-of-control inflation rate.

Throughout the campaign, the two sides sparred over the issue of television debates. The negotiations were made considerably more difficult by Independent Presidential candidate John Anderson, a Republican Congressman from Illinois, who demanded to be included in any televised meeting between the candidates. President Carter strongly opposed Anderson's inclusion, Governor Reagan steadfastly urged it and the impasse between the two men seemed unbreakable.

However, as election day approached, with the outcome still very much in doubt, both sides saw a television debate as being a means for scoring a final "knock-out" blow and agreed to one ninety-minute, face-to-face meeting between Carter and Reagan. Anderson could, by that time, be eliminated from participation since his standing in the polls had fallen to single digit numbers.(36)

In his approach to his historic meeting with Reagan, Carter's strategy was to cloak himself with the mantle of incumbency and paint a vivid contrast between himself as the statesman who had maintained the peace for four years and Reagan as an untried, right-wing, bellicose extremist. Reagan's strategy was to defuse any public fear that his election might result in war with the Soviets and to saddle Carter with the burden of being in the White House while inflation rates soared and American hostages were seized in Iran. In retrospect, the format of the debate clearly favored the challenger. It provided for brief answers to questions and even briefer retorts on the part of a candidate to the answers given by his opponent. Therefore, the format favored superficiality and did not allow for rigorous, in-depth investigation of the candidates' knowledge and beliefs. As the incumbent, Carter presumably would have benefitted from an in-depth discussion of issues since he would have greater familiarity with them than Reagan. A debate format which severely restricts discussion of issues generally works to the advantage of the challenger and makes a virtue of glib, abbreviated, superficial treatment of issues.

During their ninety minute encounter held one week before voters went to the polls and watched by an estimated 100,000,000 people, neither Carter nor Reagan scored a verbal knock-out blow. Neither made a fatal blunder.(37) Both men

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"looked" good on the television screens and both seemed reasonably comfortable and calm, even though at least one of them confessed to feeling "a little uptight" on the day of the debate.(38) However, Ronald Reagan won the debate.

President Carter, who scored well in terms of debating points and who managed to make remarks designed to appeal to all of the Democratic Party's traditional voting groups (Blacks, Jews, Hispanics and southerners), simply was not able to convince his audience that Reagan was a dangerous extremist. The challenger's pleasant demeanor, easy smile, soothing voice and the warmth he projected all acted to dispell the image of recklessness and impulsiveness which the Democrats had tried so hard to convey. Reagan's debating style that evening perhaps was best typified by a rejoinder he offered to one of Carter's attacks. With a now familiar nod of his head, Reagan smiled and simply said, "There you go again." Although Carter alluded to Reagan's "impulsiveness" fourteen times during their ninety minute encounter,(39) Reagan simply did not 'look" impulsive or appear threatening on the nation's television screens. Instead, he seemed thoroughly benign, if not Presidential, in his role as challenger.

It was here, of course, that Reagan's media background served him in good stead. Genial and smiling, he was both visually and verbally non-threatening. He did not come close to resembling the picture Carter had been trying to paint of him – "a portrait of the artiste as an aging warlord."(40) Even though he attacked Carter's record at various points during the ninety minute presentation, Reagan projected a benign and controlled image, thereby thwarting much of Carter's debate strategy.

According to a number of surveys, Ronald Reagan clearly won his television encounter with Jimmy Carter. The Harris poll indicated a Reagan debate victory by the margin of 44 to 26 per cent. CBS found Reagan the winner by a 44 to 36 per cent margin. A *Newsweek* poll found a Reagan victory by 34 to 26 per cent. Interestingly, *Newsweek* also discovered that among those who watched the debate there was a somewhat greater tendency to move *away* from Carter as a presidential choice. This negative effect was not seen in Reagan's case. Specifically, asked whether the debate had made them more likely to vote for Jimmy Carter or more likely to vote against him, 29 per cent replied "for" and 33 percent "against." In Reagan's case, the figures read 32

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per cent "for" and 32 per cent "against."(41)

Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin found the Republican candidate to have won the debate by a decisive 41 to 26 per cent margin. Pat Caddell, pollster for the Carter campaign, discovered that the television encounter had cut short the momentum that Carter had been developing and had caused a dangerous interruption in the incumbency trend toward the President.(42) A CBS poll perhaps was the most significant barometer of the political reaction induced by the debate. It found that, in direct response to the television debate, undecided voters were beginning to break in Reagan's favor by a 2-1 margin.(43) It was this movement of the undecideds during the final week of the campaign that caused the fatal hemorrage in the Carter cause.

On election day, Ronald Reagan won a surprisingly easy victory in his race for the Presidency, defeating Jimmy Carter by a popular vote margin of 10 per cent (51-41 per cent). A number of important factors contributed to the Reagan victory but the television debate clearly was among them. This encounter established Reagan as an acceptable alternative to the incumbent President, allowing other factors (inflation, the hostage crisis, etc.) to work to the challenger's advantage. In other words, partly as a result of the benign image he projected during his televised meeting with Carter, Reagan became a reasonable repository of and a safe expression for anti-Carter sentiment. For this reason, the 1980 television debate between the candidates was an event of considerable importance. By itself it was not the decisive element in the election's final outcome. But it helped to allow the record of Jimmy Carter, rather than the fear of Ronald Reagan, to stand as *the* issue of the campaign.

The 1981 Giscard-Mitterand Election in France

Having analyzed the debate experience in three presidential elections in the United States, it may now prove useful to compare the American debate experience with that of France in the recent Presidential election between incumbent Valery Giscard d' Estaing and challenger Francois Mitterand.

The 1981 French Presidential election constituted a rematch between the two contenders. In 1974 they had faced each other at the ballot box and the election of Giscard at that time may

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have been due, in part, to a television debate, the first ever in French Presidential politics, in which he had appeared more animated, more knowledgeable and more sharply focused than his opponent.(44) In that encounter, Giscard had accused Mitterand of being a "man of the past" and had refuted emotionally his Socialist challenger's claim that he was indifferent to the poor by retorting, "You don't have a monopoly on the heart. I am equally concerned about the social problems of France."(45) For his part, Mitterand attacked Giscard for the inadequate distribution of wealth during the Gaullist years and also charged that Giscard had betrayed Charles de Gaulle in the 1969 referendum battle which ultimately led de Gaulle to resign the Presidence of France.(46)

The initial press reaction to the debate was that Mitterand had appeared to be calm, warm and even fatherly in his demeanor while Giscard seemed poorly made-up and quite nervous as he faced the television cameras. However, the French Institute of Public Opinion found that a slight majority of its respondents believed that Giscard had performed better than his opponent.(47)

In 1981, faced with serious right-wing defections from his banner(48) as well as image problems brought about by his alleged imperiousness,(49) aloofness and what one observer referred to as his "monarchial airs,"(50) President Giscard tried to win reelection by challenging Mitterand to another face-to-face television encounter. As an articulate incumbent, Gisgard urged a free-flowing, unstructured meeting in which the candidates would question each other directly in an across-the-table dialogue. The challenger, however, insisted on a structured debate, very similar to those held in the United States, in which the candidates would be questioned by a panel of journalists. Giscard urged a free-flowing, unstructured meeting in which the candidates would question each other directly in an across-the-francaise."(51) The Paris daily *Le Monde* editorialized that it was "astonishing" that the organization of a television debate should prove so difficult in a country as organized as France.(52) In the end, however, the more structured format sought by the challenger was adopted. Not only were the candidates questioned by a panel of journalists but also strict controls were placed on studio technicians. No reaction shots, no camera movements except middle distance or close-up shots

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and no simultaneous views of the debaters were permitted.

The two-hour Giscard-Mitterand television debate was watched by 30,000,000 French citizens and though structured, proved to be a lively affair. Giscard d' Estaing took the fight aggressively to his opponent, charging, "you have been Minister of Speech for twenty years. You have talked while I have acted. As President of France, you can't afford to say, 'we'll see.'"(53) Giscard also tried hard to excite fears of communist influence in a Mitterand government, hoping that the alliance between the Socialist and Communist parties would frighten voters away from the Left and into his camp.

Mitterand responded by attacking the President for his economic policies, charging that in terms of jobs, France stood "in tenth place among the developed nations." He also took a strong position against building a neutron bomb(54) but tempered that view by taking a tough anti-Soviet stance in the matters of Afghanistan and Poland, even suggesting that the incumbent President was subservient to Moscow.(55)

At the conclusion of the debate, the French consensus was that Giscard had won – but by a rather narrow margin. His more lively speaking style contrasted favorably with the somewhat leaden style of his opponent. Also, he seemed mentally more agile, in greater command of facts and figures, and seemed the more intelligent of the two men.(56)

Before the debate, polls gave Mitterand anywhere from a 3 to an 8 percentage point lead over the incumbent. A poll conducted immediately after the debate found that 5.4 per cent of undecided voters had moved to Giscard after watching the candidates debate on television whereas only 2.6 per cent had moved to Mitterand.(57) Although this constituted a gain for the President, it was simply not enough.

Although his performance in the television debate with Giscard had been somewhat lackluster *in style*, Mitterand did *in image* what he needed to do. Just as Ronald Reagan had had to demonstrate that he was a safe and reasonable alternative to Jimmy Carter in the United States, so did François Mitterand have to demonstrate that he was a safe and reasonable alternative to Giscard d'Estaing in France.(58) This reassurance of stability Mitterand was able to provide and in accomplishing this goal, he – rather than Giscard – really won their television encounter.

On election day, Francois Mitterand defeated Valery Giscard

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d' Estaing by a margin of 51.8-48.2 per cent of the vote, becoming the first left-wing winner of a French presidential election since the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

Conclusions

After studying the impact of television debates in Presidential elections both in the United States and France, several general conclusions emerge.

First, incumbents and challengers confront radically different objectives when they debate on television. Incumbents, most recently Carter in 1980 and Giscard in 1981, try to project competent statesmanship and strive to frighten the electorate by conjuring up the specter of recklessness on the part of their opponents. "Moi ou le chaos" is very much their battlecry, just as it was for Charles de Gaulle in the 1950s and 1960s. Challengers, like Reagan and Mitterand, however, attempt to project reasonableness and try to dispel fears of the "evils" their election might bring. Since it is normally easier to project serenity than it is to communicate competence, television debates would seem better suited to further the strategy of challengers.

Second, often the perceived winner of a television debate is the candidate who, in his debate performance, *exceeds expectations*. In a similar vein, losing a debate is often due to failing to live up to one's own image. This means, therefore, that the candidate who is most articulate, most videogenic, and who scores the greatest number of debating points will not necessarily be perceived as the winner of a television debate. Since the key to victory tends to lie in exceeding expectations and since performance expectations usually are higher in the case of incumbent officeholders, television debates may well tend to benefit their challengers.

Third, the media, in helping to shape public expectations *before* the debate is held, establish the environment in which the outcome of the debate will be judged. The media's importance, therefore, is double-edged, and campaign strategists, as well as the candidates they manage, would do well to recognize this fact.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Political Campaigning,* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1960, p. 80.

(2) Herbert A. Seltz and Richard D. Yoakam, "Production Diary of the Debates," *The Great Debates,* ed., Sidney Kraus, Bloomfield: Indiana University Press, 1962, p. 95.

(3) Kurt Lang and Gladys Engle Lang, *Politics and Television,* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968, p. 234.

(4) Douglas Cater, "Notes from Backstage," *The Great Debates,* op. cit., p. 130.

(5) Richard S. Salant, "The Television Debates: A Revolution that Deserves a Future," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 26, Fall, 1962, p. 341.

(6) Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1960,* New York: Atheneum, 1961, p. 294.

(7) Under American law, candidates for the same public office must have access to the publicly owned airwaves under similar conditions. If free time is given to one, it must be given to all; if time is sold to one, it must be sold to all at the same rate. However, the Federal Communications Commission has ruled that coverage of genuine news events does not fall within the equal-time rule.

(8) *Newsweek,* September 27, 1976, pp. 28, 31.

(9) Jules Whitcover, *Marathon,* New York: Viking Press, 1977, p. 574.

(10) Gerald Pomper, *The Election of 1976,* New York: David McKay Co., 1977, p. 69.

(11) *New York Times,* September 24, 1976, p. 1.

(12) *Newsweek,* October 4, 1976, pp. 26, 27.

(13) Whitcover, op. cit. p. 596.

(14) *New York Times,* October 8, 1976, p. I.

(15) Whitcover, op. cit. p 598.

(16) Gallup found Carter the winner of the second debate by almost a 2-1 margin (50-27 per cent).

(17) *The Cleveland Press,* October 8, 1976, p. A4.

(18) Ibid., October 9, 1976, p. A5.

(19) Ibid.

(20) *New York Times,* October 8, 1976, p. 18.

(21) *The Cleveland Press,* October 7, 1976, p. C6.

(22) Whitcover, op. cit., pp. 604,607.

(23) Ibid., p. 607.

(24) *Newsweek,* October 18, 1976, pp. 22-23.

(25) See *The Milwaukee Journal,* October 7, 1976, p. 1. Also, Wisconsin Governor Patrick Lucey predicted that ethnic voters would desert Ford after hearing his "ridiculous statement." (Ibid., p. 11.)

(26) *New York Times,* October 16, 1976, p. 1.

(27) Whitcover, op. cit., p. 615.

(28) *Time,* November 1, 1976, p. 17.

(29) Pomper, op. cit., p. 72.

(30) *Newsweek,* November 8, 1976, p. 20.

(31) Ibid., November 1, 1976, p. 18.

(32) One group of researchers found that overall in the three debates, Carter appears to have exerted a greater degree of control than Ford by initiating more topics to be discussed and controlling more initiating time. (Warren E. Bechtolt, Joseph Hilyard and Carl R. Bybee, "Agenda Control in the 1976 Debates: A Content Analysis," *Journalism Quarterly,* Winter, 1977, p. 680.

(33) Davis believes that Gerald Ford was hurt also in the second debate by engaging in too much eye-contact with the cameras since a full-faced shot suggests

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less expertise and authority than a profile shot. (Leslie K. Davis, "Camera Eye-Contact by the Candidates in the Presidential Debates of 1976," *Journalism Quarterly,* Autumn, 1978, pp. 433, 437.).

(34) *Newsweek,* October 18, 1976, p. 24.

(35) Ibid., November 1, 1976, p. 21.

(36) The League of Women Voters, sponsor of the debate, had ruled that any candidate who stood at least at the 15 per cent level in the national polls would be included in the debate.

(37) Each man made at least one statement that caused something of a stir. Carter remarked that he had discussed the problem of nuclear weapons with his 13 year old daughter and Reagan stated that in his youth, the United States did not know it had a racial problem.

(38) One report told that the "hotel man who took [Reagan's] dinner order was sure he heard the recorded sound of ocean waves playing soothingly in the challenger's suite." (*Newsweek,* November, 10, 1980, p. 35).

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid., p. 36.

(41) Ibid., p. 37.

(42) Ibid.

(43) *Time,* November 10, 1980, p. 18.

(44) *New York Times,* May 5, 1981, p. A4.

(45) *Time,* May 20, 1974, p. 52.

(46) *New York Times,* May 11, 1974, p. 3.

(47) Ibid., May 12, 1974, p. 10.

(48) In the first round of presidential voting on April 26, the neo-Gaullist Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, captured 18 per cent of the vote. His subsequent endorsement of Giscard was tepid and on the day following his defeat, Giscard accused him of "premeditated treason."

(49) In an effort to dispel the image of imperiousness, Giscard allowed photo sessions just before the election which showed him with his family in the kitchen, at the dinner table, in his shirt-sleeves, etc. See *Paris Match,* April 24, 1981, pp. 50-61.

(50) Morris Dickstein, "Paris Letter," *Partisan Review,* No. 3, 1981, p. 426.

(51) *New York Times,* May 5, 1981, p. A4.

(52) *Le Monde,* May 4, 1981, p. 3.

(53) *Newsweek,* May 18, 1981, p. 59.

(54) *New Statesman,* May 15, 1981, p. 7.

(55) *The Economist,* May 9-15, 1981, pp. 77.

(56) *The New Republic,* May 23, 1981, p. 11.

(57) *Newsweek,* op. cit., p. 59.

(58) The fear of Communist influence in a Mitterand government had been nullified somewhat by the sharply reduced strength shown by the Communists in the first round of Presidential voting when Communist leader George Marchais polled only 15 per cent of the vote. One observer pointed out that the communist setback in the first round of voting "ruined Valery Giscard d'Estaing's campaign by depriving him of the indispensible Red Bogy." [*The Nation*, May 23, 1981, p. 623].

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BOOK REVIEWS

JOEL SELIGMAN
The Transformation of Wall Street
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1982

During the last half-century, America's system of corporate finance has been fundamentally transformed. Long gone are the days when new securities sales were dominated by private investment banks such as J.P. Morgan and Company; when references to bear raids or stock market pools appeared daily in the press; when the New York Stock Exchange could be described as a private club; when Senate hearings riveted public attention with revelations of fraudulent bond sales, preferred stockholder lists, and bribed journalists who touted securities or stock price manipulation. Gone, too, are the public utility holding companies, the least justifiable corporate structure to evolve during the 1920s bull market.

In the past decade, fixed minimum commission rates, a way of life on the New York Stock Exchange since 1792, have been abolished. Efforts are now under way to partially or fully supplant the hardwood floors of America's securities exchanges with an electronically linked national securities market system.

The principal actor in this transformation of Wall Street has been the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In this fascinating book, Seligman draws on unpublished SEC files and extensive personal interviews. In recounting the birth and growth of the SEC and its leaders, he has written no less than the history of modern corporate finance.

DAVID C. HOAGLIN et al.
Data for Decisions
Abt Books, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982

Decision makers, in translating information into action, depend upon researchers to gather and to summarize the data necessary to shape policy. For best results, the decision maker guides the overall approach and judges the quality of the information. These tasks raise questions: What methods are

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feasible in the available time? Do the data fit the policy problem? Can they provide adequate conclusions? Do the data involve important biases? What challenges to their validity are likely to arise? Does the report give all the key details?

Data-gathering methods have differing abilities to address three types of policy concerns: understanding effects of programs, measuring the status quo, and predicting the future. The authors deal with these concerns in nontechnical language; they have organized the methods chapters according to the primary concerns and have added short chapters on two important special issues in information policy: checking for mistakes and frauds, and ensuring privacy and confidentiality.

TIMOTHY GREEN
The New World of Gold
Walker and Company, New York, NewYork, 1981

When Timothy Green, journalist and worldwide authority on gold, wrote *The World of Gold* in 1968, the price of gold was $35 an ounce. "Since then, the world of gold has changed beyond all recognition," Mr. Green asserts. Consequently, he has rewritten more than three quarters of his internationally-acclaimed book, added new chapters, and significantly expanded existing ones.

Today, the price of gold is around $500 an ounce, and there is increasing discussion of the possibility of a return to the gold standard. Gold can now be held privately in America, Britain, and Japan. New gold markets are flourishing everywhere, from New York to Hong Kong, and from Singapore to Riyadh. The energy crisis of the last decade has brought about soaring inflation, and given the oil-producing nations tremendous financial muscle in the gold market.

The New World of Gold guides you from the depths of a South African gold mine into the back rooms of the great London banking houses. You will relive the thrilling California and Klondike gold rushes; accompany a smuggler with $500,000 worth of gold bullion sewn into his clothes; venture into the wilds of the Amazon, where the great Brazilian gold rush is radically altering the cultural and environmental face of the country; and end up on the frenzied floor of the New York Commodities Exchange.

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INDEX TO VOLUME 7

Bailey, Norman A.
Mechanics and Implications of the Reestablishment of a Gold Standard 153
Bandow, Doug
The United States Versus the Law of the Sea 195
Bennett, James T. & Thomas J. DiLorenzo
Politicians, Policy, and Public Opinion 281
Bowers, Stephen R.
An Assessment of the Polish Crisis: The East European View 257
The Normalization of Czechoslovakia (with T. David Port) 323
Brodin, Eric
The Family in Sweden 357
Dima, Nicholas
Southeast European Boundary Disputes 241
Contemporary Soviet Modernization and its Ethnic Implications: 1959-1979 337
Evans, G. Russell
The Influence of Pacifism on the U.S. Armed Forces 167
Farber, Samuel
Economism and Social Democracy in the Russian Revolutionary Movement 95
Gilbert, Robert E.
Television Debates and Presidential Elections: The United States and France 411
Kiracofe, Clifford A., Jr.
The Communist Takeover of Mozambique: An Overview 115
Laverty, Thomas K. H.
The Soviet Central Planning Process: New Methods and Continuing Problems 207
Meerman, Jacob and Susan Hill Cochrane
The Population Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa 349
Monk-Turner, Elizabeth
Sex and Voting Behavior in the United States of America 369
Osterfeld, David
Assessing the New International Order: Prospects for Third World Development 3
Reynolds, Morgan
Contradictions of Unionism 387
Richardson, Robert C. III
High Frontier: "The Only Game in Town" 55
Senese, Donald J.
The Defense of East Asia 67
Spears, John
Rehabilitating Watersheds 27
Tashjean, John E.
Political Science and Anthropology: The Prospects for Complete Understanding of Western Thought 172
Thompson, Walter G.
Racial Integration in U.S. Schools: The "Busing" Controversy . . . 129
Affirmative Action 377
Wittich, Gunter
Gold and the International Monetary Fund 293
Zinam, Oleg
On Equality, Equity, Economic Wellbeing and Dignity: An Economist's View 269

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

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